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BRIEF OF THE CROSS-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction1 of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 
Whether the real property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah qualified for 
homestead exemption on April 17, 2001, when a prejudgment Writ of Attachment was issued 
against the property.2 (Addendum 8, page 19, line 25; page 20, lines 1-18) 
lTimeliness of Cross-Appelants' appeal is questioned. See Addendum 15. 
2
 Although a hearing was held on March 26, 2001, on the motion for a writ of attachment, 
(Addendum 1, page 126), the order granting the motion was not signed until April 16, 2001 
(Addendum 4). The prejudgment Writ of Attachment was issued the following day, April 17, 
2001 (Addendum 3). This is when the contingent lien of the prejudgment Writ of Attachment 
was established. Miller questions the use of the phrase "judicial lien seized the property" by 
Houghtons and Thomas' in their opening brief, "judicial lien" is defined in 78-23-2(4) to mean 
wta lien on property obtained by judgment or other legal process instituted for the purpose of 
collecting an unsecured debt." There was no judgment against Miller. So for this to qualify as a 
"judicial lien" as defined in the statute, there must be legal process for the purpose of collecting 
an unsecured debt. There was no debt, secured or unsecured, owed by Miller to Houghtons and 
Thomas'. There was no debtor/creditor relationship at all between the parties prior to the 
judgment granted by the trial court on April 10, 2003. The indebtedness claimed by Houghtons 
and Thomas' was for promissory notes, to which Miller was not a party, that were issued by 
LD&B Management, Inc. (LD&B), an entity in which Miller was neither an owner, officer, or 
employee (Addendum 1, pages 504-505). Houghtons obtained a judgment against LD&B for the 
amount of their promissory notes on March 13, 2000, in Third District Court, case number 
990399712. On that same date, Thomas' obtained a judgment against LD&B for the amount of 
their promissory notes in Third District Court, case number 990300746. Both Houghtons and 
Thomas' each received a satisfaction of judgment for the amounts of these judgments. In 
statements subscribed and sworn by Douglas F. White, attorney for Houghtons and Thomas', 
they each acknowledged a satisfaction of their judgments. The satisfaction of judgment was 
filed on September 7, 2001, in their respective cases. (See Attachments B and C of Miller's 
Appellant Docketing Statement submitted in this case on January 29, 2004.) Therefore, because 
no unsecured debt or judgment existed against Miller, the prejudgment writ of attachment should 
not be characterized as a "judicial lien" that "seized the property." 
1 
Issue 2 
Whether the declaration of homestead filed on March 27, 2003, defeated the prejudgment 
Writ of Attachment issued against the real property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah 
on April 17, 2001.3(Addendum 8, page 19, line 25; page 20, lines 1-20; page 22, lines 8-13) 
Standard of Review4: The standard of review in this case for the above stated issues is for 
correctness of facts as well as correctness of the law. Because this is an appeal of an equity case, 
"In an appeal of an equity case the [Court of Appeals] may weigh the facts as well as review the 
law, but will reverse on the facts only when the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings of the trial court." Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). Also "[s]ince 
appeal may be had on the facts as well as the law in equity cases, it is our duty, when called 
upon, to weigh the facts as well as to review the law." Jensen v. Brown 639 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1981). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE5 
On November 25, 2000, Cross-Appellants, Jerry Houghton, Susan Houghton, Kendall R, 
Thomas, Marlene Thomas, and the 1995 Thomas Family Trust (Houghtons and Thomas') filed a 
complaint alleging fraud (Addendum 1, pages 1-20). Cross-Appellee, Glen E. Miller (Miller) 
3
 Miller has replaced "nullified the judicial lien ordered" with "defeated the prejudgment writ of 
attachment issued." The word "nullified" means "invalidated." The word "defeated" means 
"overcome in battle." The phrase "may defeat a prejudgment writ of attachment," was used by 
the court in its legal discussion of the order issued on August 7, 2003 (Addendum 9, page 2, lines 
2-3 of the legal discussion). As far as the use of the term "judicial lien", see the discussion in 
footnote 2. 
4
 Miller has included facts as part of the standard of review for this case, because it is an equity 
case. Also, Miller does not agree with some of the "facts" or how some "facts" were presented 
in Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief. 
5
 Some of the page numbers that are used from the court transcript at Addendum 1 may contain 
minor errors. I have attempted to cite the exact pages of the record, but because of my situation 
of being incarcerated, I have never seen, nor do 1 have access to the court records to verify the 
accuracy of the page numbers of the quoted and cited documents. I am certain of the document, 
but not the court assigned page number. 
2 
answered this complaint through his attorney, Blake S. Atkin, denying said allegations 
(Addendum 1, pages 72-82). 
On December 5, 2000, Houghtons and Thomas' moved the court for the issuance of a 
prejudgment writ of attachment (Addendum 1, pages 23-25). On January 12, 2001, Houghtons 
and Thomas' amended their previous motion. In this amended motion they stated, "1) That the 
Defendant [Miller] is not a resident of this state, [and] 6) That the Defendant fraudulently 
contracted the debt or incurred the obligation respecting the action brought." These were the two 
reasons given to the court as to why they were entitled to a prejudgment writ of attachment 
(Addendum 1, page 85; see also Addendum 8, page 18, lines 17-21). 
Miller, through his attorney, contested the motion and moved the court to strike the 
defective affidavits provided by Houghtons and Thomas'. Miller also filed an affidavit 
clarifying his residency (Addendum 1, pages 89-104). 
On April 16, 2001, the trial court granted the motion for a prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment (Addendum 3). White recorded this order on June 15, 2001 (Addendum 4). 
Miller was not privy to any other developments in this case until June 6, 2003. On this 
date Miller was served a Writ of Execution and Praecipe identifying two of Miller's properties to 
be sold at execution. The Writ of Execution was issued on May 1, 2003 (Addendum 7).6 
While reading the Writ of Execution, Miller discovered for the first time that a judgment 
had been entered against him in this case. The date of the judgment was April 10, 2003 
(Addendum 6 and Addendum 7). Because Miller had never received notice of any judgment or 
In an apparent attempt to deprive Miller of his right to be informed of exempt property and his 
right to request a hearing, no attachments were with the Writ of Execution as required by Rule 
69(g) and the advisory committee note to paragraph (g), U.R.C.P. Miller was fortunate that at 
the time of service of the Writ of Execution, he was reviewing the Utah Code books in the jail 
(Addendum 1, pages 433-436). 
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proceedings in this case, he assumed that the judgment was a default judgment (Addendum 1, 
pages 431-432). 
On June 12, 2003, Miller requested an exemption hearing because his property was 
entitled to a homestead exemption (Addendum 1, page 410; and Addendum 5). 
On July 18, 2003, Miller moved the court to stay the Writ of Execution. The stay of the 
Writ of Execution was ordered on July 22, 2003 (Addendum 1, pages 419-420). 
On August 4, 2003, the exemption hearing was conducted (Addendum 8). As a result of 
this hearing the trial court judge issued his "Order Granting Homestead Exemption" (Addendum 
9). The "FINDINGS" section of this order contained five paragraphs. From the "LEGAL 
DISCUSSION" section of this order came the legal conclusion that "The prejudgment writ of 
attachment filed on March 26, 2001, is defeated by the filing of a homestead declaration on 
March 26, 2003 (Addendum 11, page 3, paragraph 13). The final sentence of the order stated, 
"Mr. White to prepare the order consistent with this decision." (Addendum 9, page 3) 
Mr. White, attorney for Houghtons and Thomas', prepared an order. However, Miller 
contested it for errors and for not being consistent with the court's order dated August 7, 2003. 
Because Miller was moved from a county jail to the prison, he requested an enlargement of time 
to prepare his objections. This was granted (Addendum 1, pages 455-460). 
Meanwhile, Mr. White ordered the sheriff to conduct the execution sale without a court 
order lifting the court-ordered stay from July 22, 2003. This was also in violation of the order 
granting Miller an extension of time to respond to Mr. White's proposed order. Furthermore, 
there was no new writ of execution issued as required by U.R.C.P. Rule 69(h)(2) which states, 
"If the originally scheduled date of sale for which notice has been given has passed, notice 
of the new date and time shall be provided as required herein. No sale may be held until 
the Court has decided upon the issues presented at the hearing." 
A 
Also Rule 69(i)(2) states, 
"...if such postponement is for a longer time than 72 hours, notice shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of such sale is required to be given." 
On September 16, 2003, Mr. White filed a "Notice of Cancellation of Sheriff s Sale (Addendum 
1, pages 462-463). He ordered the Sheriff to cancel the sale that he, Mr. White, had ordered.7 
Subsequently, Miller filed an affidavit of facts constituting contempt of court in this matter 
(Addendum 1, pages 466-468). 
On September 19, 2003, Miller's objections to the proposed order were filed, (Addendum 
1, pages 471-475), and Mr. White responded with a second order. Relatively few changes were 
made, so again, Miller opposed this order and submitted an order that he considered consistent 
with the court's order dated August 7. 2003 (Addendum 1, pages 478-479; and Addendum 13). 
On October 14, 2003, Mr. White filed his objections to Miller's proposed order and 
requested an Oral argument (Addendum 1, pages 496-499). 
On December 4, 2003, a hearing was conducted (Addendum 10). After the hearing, the 
court signed the order that authorized the homestead property of Miller to be sold (Addendum 
11). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 27, 2001, the primary residence of Miller and his family was a house located at 
891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah. They had resided in that house since 1994. In December of 
2001, a fire destroyed part of that house and made it uninhabitable. At that time, the house 
The reasons stated for canceling the sale were: "1 . There is an error in the property description 
of Property No. 2, [and] 2. The notice is posted under the heading of the 'Tooele Valley Justice 
Court' and not the Third District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah." It should be 
noted that the same description of Property No. 2 was used in the Writ of Execution for the sale 
on July 29, 2004, as was used in the Writ issued May 1, 2003. Also, all writs have been issued 
by the Third District Court. 
5 
located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah was being rented, so Millers leased another house. 
The fire-damaged house was not repaired, and in July of 2002, it was foreclosed upon.8 
When the renters moved out of the property located at 358 North 100 East at the end of 
February, 2002, the house was left uninhabitable (Addendum 8, page 14, lines 6-16). In 
Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief (page 4, paragraph 6) they claim that on March 26. 2001, 
"the old house was then uninhabitable and provided no shelter or income (See Addendum 8, 
page 14, lines 6-16, and Addendum 11, "Findings" at paragraph 10)." This claim is not correct. 
Counsel made the above statement and he included it as a "Finding". However, it is not 
supported by any evidence. 
In Miller's objection to the order found in Addendum 11, he stated, 
"There are other misstatements of fact made in the Plaintiffs' attorney's additional 
findings as enumerated 6 through 12. Because the added paragraphs are not consistent 
with the 'Findings' found in the 'Court Order', they should be eliminated." (Addendum 
1, page 478, paragraph 3). 
In September, 2003, Miller's wife and family began cleaning up the house and making 
repairs to make the property located at 358 North 100 East inhabitable for a family residence 
(Addendum 8, page 22, lines 9-10). 
However, in Houghton's and Thomas' opening brief (page 4, paragraph 7), they claim, 
"In the early part of 2003, Mrs. Miller began to make repairs to the old house at 358 North 100 
East, Tooele, Utah in preparation to move in." Again this claim is not correct. At the hearing on 
August 4, 2003, Mr. White clearly states that Miller told him repairs began in September. So 
putting "early 2003" as the start date is without foundation, fact, or truth (Addendum 8, page 22, 
Because the foreclosure was a matter of public record, and one of the Plaintiffs, Marlene 
Thomas, works in the Tooele County Recorder's office, Mr. White could have easily verified 
this fact, instead of presuming the foreclosure was December of 2002. 
6 
lines 9-10; See also Miller's Objections to Findings 6 through 1 .! li Uidei KMin* 1 at 
Addendum 1, page 478, paragraph 3).' 
On March 26, 2003, Miller's wife and family moved into the old house and she picpaied 
a Declaration of Homestead (Addendum ) I in , • i done without any attempt to defeat any 
existing lien and to provide protection and stability for the family (Addendum 8, page29, lines 5-
11; Addendum 1, page 450, line 16).10 
..:huM- and Thomas' opening brief (page 5, paragraph 11) they claim, "Cross-
Appellee opposed the sheriffs sale because his wife hau s=<^ee.^n. . e,i •-: ' :"r.e nouse and 
filed . . ,\L:raih • •; ? \Luui 27, 2003." This statement as to why Miller 
opposed the sale is not supported by any fact.! * 
In fact, Miller opposed ihe Sheriffs sale because of Utah Code Section 78-23-3(3), 
which states in part that, "A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or 
forced sale..." 
Because the judgment obtained by Houghtons and Thomas* is a judicial lien, Miller 
believed that his properly declared homestead was exempl from KM Msufinn oi forced sale. 
This belief w as held because the judicial lien of Houghtons and Thomas' does not fall within the 
Prior to the hearing on August 4, 2003, Mr. White asked Miller when cleanup and repairs were 
started. Miller told him September. 
10
 Prior to the hearing on August 4, 2003, Mr. White asked Miller when his wife moved into the 
house. Miller told him March. However, in the hearing, he told the court "May" as the move-in 
date. Miller caught the error and said "No", but counsel continued to assert May or a later date 
(Addendum 8, page 22, lines 2-9). It would appear that he was trying to assert May because the 
judgment was entered April 10, 2003, and the Writ of Execution was issued May 1, 2003. A 
move-in date after that would show the home was not occupied as a residence when the Writ of 
Execution was issued. This becomes a moot point as a homestead can be claimed up until time 
of sale, and occupancy is not necessary. Sanders v. Cassity 586 P. 2d 423 (Utah 1978) and Rich 
Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, 385 P.2d 155 (Utah 1963). 
This statement seems to wrongly infer that Miller's wife moved into the house ; 
Declaration of Homestead in an effort to prevent the sale. 
7 
exceptions listed in 78-23-3(3)(a) through (d) (Addendum 8, page 8, line 8 through page 15, line 
1; Addendum 1, pages 445-454). 
Furthermore, it is an established fact that another reason Miller opposed the Sheriff sale 
was the fact that his wife had been awarded the use of the house by the court as Alimony and 
Support pursuant to Utah Code Section 30-4-5 which states, 
"Like rights and remedies [of an abandoned spouse] shall be extended to either husband 
or wife of the imprisonment of the other in the state prison under a sentence of one year 
or more when suitable provision has not been made for the support of the one not so 
imprisoned." 
Additionally, Utah Code Section 78-23-6 states that 
uAn individual is entitled to exemption of the following property to the extent 
reasonably necessary for the support of the individual and his dependants: (1) money or 
property received, and rights to receive money or property for alimony or separate 
maintenance." 
Wherefore, Miller opposed the Sheriffs sale for all of these reasons (Addendum 8, page 15, lines 
2-14, and Addendum 1, pages 446-447 (Exhibit 2), 449-450). 
On August 2, 2003, the court ordered, 
"Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that subject property, 358 North 100 East, 
Tooele, UTAH, is subject to the homestead exemption exercised by the Millers and 
exempted up to $40,000.00 per Utah Code Annotated 78-23-3(2)(b)(ii)." (Addendum 9, 
page 3). 
However, in the opening brief (page 5, paragraph 11), Houghtons and Thomas' claim as an 
additional fact that the court 
"...would not stay the sale of the house because its value exceeded the value of the 
alleged homestead exemption. (See Addendum 8, page 30, lines 17-22; Addendum 10, 
page 14, lines 9-14, and page 22, lines 6-8; and Addendum 12)." 
Miller takes exception to this fact, because the court never made that statement. While the judge 
ruled that the homestead exemption amount was $40,000.00, he never stated in the references 
8 
provided by Mr. White above, that he would not stay the sale of the house because its value 
exceeded the value of the allege nestead exemption. I he references to the record provided 
by Mr. White merely establish the property tax valuation amount for Tooele County Corporation. 
This amount was $200,09^ fAii-ui: .1 * was stipulated by c<Jiinsel that the value for 
determining equity in excess of the homestead exemption would be the assessed value by Tooele 
County (Addendum 10, page 14, lines I I I ) - in no way establishes t the court 
"woiM '::- 'I--- lo of the house because its value exceeded the value of the alleged 
homestead exemption." 
There is one more fact • the court should be aware. On September 24, 2003, the 
judgment signed on April 10, 2003, was entered into the registry of judgments for Tooele 
County. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Constitution of Utah, statutes, and case law, a! -• i - ;•• u this case, all 
clearly affirm that a homestead can be claimed up until the time of sale. It is also clear that the 
right to declare a homestead is a right that comes with ownership of properh h i s alst * hr.v iliat 
the ik'tLtratnn] o| ,i limm-stead exemption may be made on more than one property. 
Furthermore, the right to declare a homestead on a primary residence may be changed as the 
property tl lat is used as tl le primary residence is disposed of or acquired. Statutes and case law 
overwhelmingly support the trial comt decision to grant Miller a homestead exemption in the 
property located at 35i- = <» ».-K ; *• , : decision should be affirmed. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
Argument 1 
The legal conclusion that Miller's property qualified for the homestead exemption 
recorded on March 27, 2003, and that Miller did have the right to declare a homestead exemption 
on the property when a prejudgment writ of attachment was issued on April 17, 2001, is 
supported by both evidence and law. 
Let's look at the first part of the issue, which is that the property qualified for the 
homestead exemption on April 17, 2001. 
The right to declare a homestead exemption is a constitutional right that is acquired with 
ownership in property. Sanders v. Cassitv 586 P.2d 424,425 (Utah 1978). 
It is an established fact that on April 17, 2001, Miller's primary personal residence was 
located at 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah. It is also an established fact that Miller owned a 
second house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. The Constitution of Utah recognizes 
that a homestead "may consist of one or more parcels of lands." This is statutorily set forth in 
Utah Code Section 78-23-3(2)(c) (Addendum 16). It is clear that the legislative intent was to 
allow a homestead exemption on several parcels of real property and not just one. 
It is also clear that the legislature has created a homestead exemption for two kinds of 
property, to wit, property which is not the primary personal residence and property which is the 
primary personal residence. This is found in Code Section 78-23-3(2)(a)(i) and 78-23-3(2)(a)(ii). 
The language of these statutes is clear.12 They read as follows: 
12
 In Gohler v. Wood 919 p.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court quotes its ruling in 
Perrine v Kennecott Mining Corp., where it stated, "Thus, we will interpret a statute according to 
its plain language, unless such reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant 
contravention of the express purpose of the statute." 
m 
78-23-3(2)(a): "An individual is entitled to a homestead exemption consist;. f 
property in this state in an amount not exceeding: 
(i) $5,000 in value if the property consists in whole or in part of property which is 
not the primary personal residence of the individual; or 
(ii) $20,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal residence of the 
individual." 
Therefore, under I huh liw there is a homestead exemption for property that is a primary 
personal residence, and one for property that is not a primary personal residence. Just because 
the property located at 0 8 North 10(i Hast was not the primary personal residence of Miller on 
April 17, 2001, does not preclude the property, as claimed by Houghtons and Thomas' in their 
opening brief, (page 8, lines 1 <• ' .*^ < .ul exemption. 
Therefore, on April 17, 2001, the property in question qualified for a homestead 
exemption under the provisions o r * -23-3(2)(a)(i). a :v. • •* ! ^ l ^ -snored by Mr. 
White in I loughtons ; nomas' opening brief where he only cited 78-23-3(2)(a)(ii). (page 7, 
lines 8-17) 
On page 7 o^ I loii«»hlons :iml Thomas* opening brief, reference is made to statutory 
mandates. They state, 
"The Utah Exemption Act b , as set forth in Section 78-23-4 et al, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, sets forth the right to claim a homestead exemption, but only after 
complying with the statutory mandates." 
As set forth ii 1 Miller's section on f hienninalix •.; I ,i\\, Code Section 78-23-4(1) is 
dispositive in this case in stating the "statutory mandates". One of the statutory mandates is to 
file the declaration of homestead at the office of the cot11lty recorder 01 to serve it upon the 
sheriff HI other oftuvr "PRIOR i u i l l L HAL. bTATED I N THE NOTICE OF SUCH 
EXECUTION." (Emphasis added) 
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 The Utah Exemptions Act is not limited to 78-23-4, et iv I; includes all of Chapter 23. 
Therefore, it seems that the correct reference should be 78-23-1 et .•»! r o d e Section 78-23-4 
covers procedure for declaring the homestead exemption. 
April 17, 2001, was not the date of execution. Furthermore, the prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment was not an execution document. Execution could not take place until after a 
judgment was entered. The first execution date set for this property after judgment was July 23, 
2003. Therefore, according to Utah Code Section 78-23-4(1), this property could have been 
claimed as a homestead prior to this date, which was done. 
Another statutory provision provided by the legislature is the ability of a homeowner to 
change their primary residence, and therefore, select another homestead. Again, there is 
dispositive law on this. Utah Code Section 78-23-3(6) states: "The sale and disposition of one 
homestead does not prevent the selection or purchase of another." 
When Millers were forced to leave their home at 891 Upland Drive due to a fire in 
December 2001, another primary residence was selected. Due to the renters occupying the 
property at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, Miller and his family rented another house. After 
Miller went to prison and it became apparent that it would be for an extended time, it was 
decided to use the rental property, which had become vacant, as their primary residence. 
Accordingly, the house was cleaned up, repaired, and occupied as their primary residence. 
Thus, as allowed by law, the property at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, which had 
previously qualified for a homestead exemption as a non-primary residence, now qualified for a 
homestead exemption as their primary residence. This property was selected and declared as a 
homestead prior to any judgment or prior to the scheduling of an execution sale subsequent to the 
judgment. 
If the sale of the property had been conducted on March 26, 2001, then that date would 
have been determinative as to whether the subject property was the primary residence and 
properly declared homestead of the Millers. In Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief, there is 
12 
nothing presented to refute the plain language of the statutes, as explained above. ,\liu h allow a 
homestead to be declared i i the sale of the property. 
Additionally, the concluding statement of Argument Houghtons and Thomas' 
opening brief on page 8 is, 'Therefore, tl' . or exem?>f-ons set forth in Section 78-23-
3(3)(a)(b)(c) and (d) do not apply because they only apply in instances where specific property 
qualifies as a 'homestead'." This is a •• -.n * * i * leous stat * • ; i • .•• • M ; m 78-23-
3(jj ^-d. . aiini ivj clearly shows that the subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) are NOT 
"protections or exemptions" for the homestead or homestead exernpi the contrary, 
these four subparagraph . -.aie the type of liens that are the exceptions to the homestead 
exemption and defeat it! 
None of these exceptions apj . Houghtons and Thomas' judicial lien (Addendum 
1, page 452, lines 3-12; Addendum 8, page : :ies 9-24). Therefore, by law, their judicial lien 
cannot deny Miller o\ the right to declare a homestead exemr ^r,;!\-'- prior to any 
sale. 
None of the positions taken or opinions expressed ;. •-, ^-nng 
brief j p \rgument 1 contained any case law to back them up, except a South Carolina 
case to define residence, which is already defined in the law. 
i |n\\n </r, (he lojal position that supports Miller's claim that a homestead can be selected 
and declared up until the time of sale is not only supported by the law, but by the case law as 
well, I,et's 1« • <a v:;i - eases: 
In Evans v. Jensen 168 P. 764, 765 (Utah 1917), the Supreme Court stated. 
"Courts have frequently held that the exemption may be claimed at any time before the 
property is sold; and that the right to claim the exemption is determined as of the time 
when the sale is about to take place."14 
In Payson Exch. Sav. Bank v. Tietien 225 P. 599, 600 (Utah 19241 the court held that, 
"Indeed in this jurisdiction, it is quite sufficient if the judgment debtor notifies the 
sheriff or officer holding an execution or order of sale that he claims the premises 
attempted to be levied upon as his homestead." 
In Brown v. Cleverly 83 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1938). the court stated 
"It is a matter of record on the last appeal that the property which appellants seek to 
have declared subject to their claim was selected by the Cleverly's as their 
homestead...four days prior to the entering of judgment by the court in the original 
action. Therefore, at the time appellants obtained a judgment against Cleverly's there 
was no property against which a judgment lien could attach." 
In Sanders v. Cassity 586 P.2d 425. 426 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court once again 
affirmed that: 
"...a declaration of homestead may be made at any time after judgment and before sale 
in order to claim the protection of Section 28-1-1 [currently 78-23-3(3)]." 
"The formalities of section 28-1-10 [currently 78-23-4] also have as their purpose that 
of protecting innocent purchasers... Thus the requirement is that any homestead interest 
must be declared prior to sale." 
The court further states: 
"If the legislature intended otherwise, the statute could have required that the 
declaration be made prior to judgment or upon conveyance, or devise. It is obvious that 
the reason this was not done is because it is not necessary to raise the homestead 
exemption until after a judgment lien has been obtained and the occupant is faced with 
dispossession due to execution or forced sale." 
Finally, they state: 
"...the most reasonable construction is that the homestead is immune from judicial lien, 
execution, or forced sale providing a formal declaration of the existing exemption is 
made prior to the time set for sale or execution." 
14
 In earlier cases, such as Kimball v. Salisbury 53 P. 1037 (1898), the declaration of homestead 
was allowed after sale. 
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All of these cases are in harmony with the trial court's legal conclusion: 
"Under the statutory authority of Utah Code Annotated 78-23-1 et seq. and the Sanders 
v. Cassity decision, a homestead exemption may be made at any time after judgment 
and before sale. Plaintiffs argument that a prejudgment writ of attachment, (or 
judgment for that matter) filed before the homestead exemption, is as unpersuasive 
today as it was to the Utah Supreme Court twenty five years ago...Furthermore, even 
though the Millers may not have been in occupancy on the property at the time of the 
prejudgment writ of attachment, or at the time of judgment, is irrelevant, as the statute 
neither requires such in order to declare the exemption and Utah case law recognizes 
that occupancy is unnecessary. Rich Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, 385 P.2d 155 (Utah 
1963)." 
Houghtons and Thomas' provide nothing in their opening brief to show this legal 
conclusion was in error, Therefore Ilk' emul iiiliiii1 .InmM Iv allium d 
Argument 2 
Whether the Declaration of 1 lomestead filed n I hi h, " l "Dt11 deleikJ the 
prejudgment Writ of Attachment issued against the real property located at 358 North 100 East, 
Tooele, Utah, on April 17, 2001 (Addendum 8, page \" v •. ;• :L* _••. JM :•. *• >age 22, 
lines 8-13). 
With it being conclusive in Utah that the property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, 
Utah could be declared' a homestead up nniil time of sale, it now becomes necessary to determine 
whether the homestead defeats the prejudgment writ of attachment issued April 17, 2001. Let's 
take a look at the relevant facts for this issue. 
On April 16, 2001, the court issued an Order on Motion for Prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment pursuant to a hearing held on March 26, .'»»:• o
 it[ 
Qn ^prjj j75 2001, a Writ of Attachment was issued to the Tooele County Sheriff 
(Addendum 3) 
On Ji ine 6 2001 the Writ of Attachment was returned to the court (Addendum 1, pages 
133-146). 
On June 15, 2001, Douglas F. White, attorney for the Houghtons and Thomas', recorded 
the Order on Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the subject property 
(Addendum 4). 
On March 27, 2003, Miller's wife filed a Declaration of Homestead on the subject 
property (Addendum 5). 
On April 10, 2003, a judgment was rendered against Miller in favor of Houghtons and 
Thomas' by the Third District Court (Addendum 6). 
On September 24, 2003, a Notice of Judgment recorded in the Registry of Judgments was 
filed with the court (Addendum 1, pages 476-477). 
The Determinative Law on this matter is Utah Code Section 78-23-3(3) (Addendum 16). 
This Code section sets forth the types of judicial liens that may defeat a declaration of 
homestead. If there is a judicial lien that falls within the exceptions listed, it will defeat a 
homestead declaration made subsequent to it. If it does not fall within the exceptions, the 
homestead declaration will defeat the judicial lien. 
In Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief, page 10, they state "It is the Cross-appellant's 
contention that no homestead exemption can be claimed in March of 2003 that will defeat the 
judicial lien ordered against the property in March of 2001." What follows this statement is an 
array of quotes from different court cases. They never once show why the court erred in their 
legal conclusion, and they are arranged in a manner to be misleading. 
For example, Houghtons and Thomas' claim that the issue in Sanders v. Cassity is 
different than the issue in the case at bar. They never distinguish how the issue of Sanders v. 
Cassity, which was determining the question of whether a homestead exemption could be made 
prior to sale, is different than the issue in this case. They state that the "footnote 4 at page 426" 
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distinguishes its ruling from this fundamental difference. However, footnote 4 at page 426 is "99 
Utah 403, in. I MI i'i i r'!<>)." This is the case of McMurdie v. Chugg. Following this 
statement about "footnote 4" Houghtons and Thomas' provide a quote consisting of two 
paragraphs. The omission of the quotation marks after ll i. :" fii si j )ai agi a.j )1 i is the ii idication that 
the paragraphs are sequential. Even the language of the second paragraph seems to indicate that 
it follows the first one. However, a look at page 426 of Sanders v. Cassity shows J 
paragraphs are not even connected and the second paragraph comes before the first paragraph. 
The lien referenced in Evans v. Jensen 168 P. 762 (Utah 1917), was a mechanic's ! 
that attached to Jensen's properly prior to his homestead declaration. Mechanic's liens are 
exempted under 78-23-3(3)(b) and (d). The judicial lien obtained by Houghtons and Thomas' is 
not a mechanic's lien. 
A review of Evans v. Jensen and the court's application of it in Sanders, which involve 
Dunham, shows it is evident that the court differeir >w between >)\x'v i>:v< - li.'n-. v:i u 
liens (78-23-3(3) defeat a subsequent declaration of homestead. However, general judicial liens 
are defeated by a declaration of homestead made before the dau i-: . .; p;.-[•. 
Sanders ti; Supio>-»- •< .'.>»* oilirmed Dunham's homestead exemption over the judgment lien, 
just as the trial court granted Miller a homestead exemption over Houghtons and I homas' 
general judgment lien in Ihis insl;int P,IM' 
As we continue down to the next case quoted on page 10 of the Houghtons and Thomas' 
opening briei v M I"Evans v. Jensen '! **.* p •• .*< -jph- ;i quoted. However, the 
first paragraph quoted is not a quote from Evan. h is a quote found in McMurdie v. Chugg 107 
P.2d 163, 166, which is also quoted in Sanders v. Cassitv at page 4„?<u I in:1 lirn ivforom «"»! w.is 
mechanic's lien from Evans v. Jensen. It was used to support the decision in McMurdie v. 
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Chugg that a lien for the purchase price of the property could not be defeated by the subsequent 
declaration of a homestead exemption (78-23-3(3)(b). Houghtons and Thomas' judgment 
recorded on September 24, 2003, was not for the purchase price of the home. 
The second paragraph quoted refers to the case of Crosby v. Anderson 162 P. 75. In that 
case, Crosby obtained a judgment against Anderson for a tort. However, before she could 
execute on Anderson's non-exempt property, he sold it. He then used the proceeds to buy land 
and build a house for his family, the title of which was placed in his wife's name. They then 
declared the property exempt as a homestead and it defeated Crosby's judgment lien. It should 
be noted that the comma near the end of the second line after "exempt" should be a semi-colon. 
This is the grammatical punctuation in the case, and it is used to separate two complete thoughts, 
not qualify the first thought with the second. This is important because the reference to the 
conversion to a homestead before a lien attaches is referring to Jensen trying to defeat a 
mechanic's lien, and not to Anderson converting non-exempt property to a homestead exemption 
which defeated a non-excepted judicial lien. 
Nowhere among all of these quotes do Houghtons and Thomas' show how or why their 
lien is the type that can be or should be exempted under Code Section 78-23-3(3). 
Waples on Homestead and Exemption (1893), page 306, explains that in states where a 
homestead exemption can be claimed before the time of sale, a judgment 4is rendered subject to 
the right of the debtor to select his exempt portion. No specific lien rests upon any piece of the 
defendant's property. So, the particular piece selected after judgment, not exempt at the time of 
judgment, becomes so by selection before sale." 
While Houghtons and Thomas' quote in their opening brief from 40 C.J.S. § 54, the liens 
that are referenced fall within the exceptions to the homestead found in Code Section 78-23-3(3). 
1R 
However, Houghtons and Thomas' do not show how their claim or lien falls within the 
exceptions as the liens in the quoted rule that would show the trial court erred, other than the 
statement, "Counsel can find no exception to this rule." 
If counsel would read in C J.S. § 54 a little further, the last paragraph of subsection C 
states, "A homestead is immune from a judgment lien, execution or forced sale if the formal 
declaration of the existing exemption is made prior to the time set for sale or execution.77" This 
is the same quote used by the trial court in their Order Granting Homestead Exemption to Miller 
(Addendum 9, page 2). Footnote 77 cites Sanders v. Cassity and states, 
"Interest in real property held by judgment debtor, who was entitled to homestead 
exemption before judgment lien was recorded was immune from such lien, though 
debtor did not formally claim the homestead exemption until after the judgment was 
docketed." 
As has been previously shown, Miller was entitled to a homestead exemption when property was 
acquired. Sanders v. Cassity 586 P.2d 236, 238. 
In Houghtons and Thomas' opening brief, the assumption, or presumption made, is that 
the order and subsequent issue of a prejudgment writ of attachment was a perfected lien. 
However, because it is a prejudgment writ of attachment, it is, at most, only an inchoate or 
contingent lien. Jensen v. Eames 519 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1974). If in fact, this order of 
prejudgment writ of attachment were a perfected lien as they claim, then why did they not 
foreclose on the property before it became the primary personal residence of the Millers? 
The answer is that they did not have the right of sale. As quoted by Houghtons and 
Thomas' from Waples on page 11 of the opening Brief, in the first line, "When the law gives the 
right of attachment for debt, it gives also that of sale, to complete the object: the satisfaction of 
the debt." So, Houghtons and Thomas' did not have the right of sale until they had the right of 
attachment. Hence, the prejudgment Writ of Attachment was only a contingent lien. 
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So, when does this right to sell the property become a vested right? The next sentence of 
Waples gives the answer. "Such right is, from the time the lien attaches by seizure, a vested 
right." The opening Brief of Houghtons and Thomas' gives no evidence nor provides any 
argument to show that the prejudgment Writ of Attachment ever attached or that it was ever 
perfected. Nor did it show that if it were perfected, that it fell under the exceptions found in 
Code Section 78-23-3(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) to defeat a declaration of homestead that was made 
before the sale of the property. 
However, the facts of this case show that there was no attachment of the prejudgment 
Writ of Attachment (Addendum 1, pages 133-146; Addendum 3; Addendum 4; and Addendum 
14). Let's examine why these facts show that there was no attachment. 
The date pointed to by the Houghtons and Thomas' as to the day they attached the 
property is March 26, 2001. In order for this date to defeat a declaration of homestead, it must 
be shown that it was of the nature to be excepted from the homestead under either 78-23-
3(3)(a),(b),(c), or (d), and that it attached to the property prior to the declaration of homestead. 
We know there is not exception, but let's look at why there was no attachment until September 
24,2003. 
When the order was given in the hearing on March 26, 2001, there was not attachment. 
"A writ of attachment does not become effective until it is levied. Otherwise stated, 
without a valid levy, an order of attachment is not perfected so as to create a lien of 
attachment but remains executory until rolled by a judgment in the principal action or 
until perfected by a levy under the original or an alias order." (underline added) 6 Am 
Jur 2d §319. 
Recording of the order (Addendum 4) by Marlene R. Thomas for Douglas F. White (Plaintiff and 
Attorney for the plaintiff) does not perfect the levy. 
In 6 Am Jur 2d § 480 ATTACHMENT, it reads: 
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''Statutory provisions for an attachment are strictly construed; an attachment does not 
become a lien until the statutory attachment lien requirements are satisfied, (underline 
added) Matson Nav. Co. v. F.D.I.C, 916 P.2d 680 (Hawaii 1996); Maynard v. Phifer, 
286 S.C. 76, 332 S.E.2d 99 (1985)." 
This rule of attachment was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 
581 P.2d 1001, 1006 (Utah 1978), where it stated, "the only way this lien can be established is by 
strictly following every provision of the statute." The provisions of Rule 64C were not strictly 
followed so there was no attachment. 
Since an order doesn't create the lien, a writ of attachment must be issued pursuant to the 
order. This was done on April 17, 2001. However, a writ of attachment, in and of itself does not 
create a lien. 
"An attachment lien does not become effective merely by the issuance of the writ of 
attachment or by placing the writ in the hands of the officer. There must be an effective 
levy on the property itself and such levy is a jurisdictional requisite." (6 Am Jur 2d § 
320) 
In C.J.S. § 234 we find a description of the levy process. It says, "In general a levy 
attachment upon realty, unlike personalty, is perfected by notice and recording without the actual 
seizure and possession. To constitute a valid levy on land, the officer must do some act which 
shows that the officer has seized the property and exercised dominion over it and which is 
sufficient to put the owner or tenant upon notice." This seizure must be done under the statutory 
provisions, and strict compliance is required.1:> 
Rule 64C, U.R.C.P. governs the attachment process16. 64C(e)(l) establishes the specific 
actions the officer must take to effect the levy. The officer is required to file with the County 
15
 Other authorities that describe the requirements necessary to create a valid lien are C.J.S. § 
235 Service of Writ and Description; C.J.S. § 236 Filing and Recording; and 6 Am Jur 2d §325 
Notice, and Utah Civil Practice § 13.05. 
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 It should be noted that in Utah Civil Practice 13.05[1] Who May Seek Attachment, it says 
"The Plaintiff in an action upon a judgment, upon any contract, express or implied, or in an 
21 
Recorder a copy of the writ, a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is 
attached. 
Another significant limitation on attachments is that they must be acted upon quickly.17 
Rule 64C(h) requires the sheriff to return the writ, with a certificate of his proceedings thereon 
within 20 days after receiving the writ. This requirement is further confirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1978). Where the court 
stated, "In the instant case there was a failure to comply with Rule 64C(h), thus plaintiff did not 
acquire a lien on the attached property." 
Looking at the facts in the instant case, the Writ of Attachment was issued to the Tooele 
County Sheriff on April 17, 2001 (Addendum 3). It was returned to the court on June 6, 2001 
(Addendum 1, pages 133-146). In particular, addendum 1 page 136 shows that the sheriff 
received the Writ on April 24, 2001, from Douglas F. White. This shows that there was a total of 
43 days from receipt until return! This is an obvious failure to comply with Rule 64C(h). 
Furthermore, a review by the Tooele County Recorder (Addendum 14) shows that the 
sheriff did not record the Writ of Attachment, Description of the property, or Notice of 
attachment against the property. This is a failure to comply with Rule 64C(e). 
The only thing recorded against the property that could be a semblance of a lien is the 
Order on Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment (Addendum 4). However, this was filed 
by MRT (Marlene R. Thomas, Plaintiff and employee in the County Recorder's office) for 
Douglas F. White (Attorney for the Plaintiffs), as agent for Plaintiffs. 
6 Am Jur 2d § 321 comments on persons authorized to execute the writ: 
action against a nonresident of Utah, may seek attachment." Action against a nonresident is the 
only basis Houghtons and Thomas' could seek attachment. (Addendum 1, page 18, lines 19-21) 
17
 See 6 Am Jur 2d § 323 and Utah Civil Practice § 13.05[4](10). 
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"As a general rule, an attachment can be levied or the writ executed only by the officer 
to whom it can be levied or the writ executed only by the officer to whom it is directed, 
who, of course, must by law be duly authorized so to act; an attachment by an officer 
without authority of law is no attachment at all." Then as an observation it states, "An 
officer who executes according to the mandate of a writ for attachment is an agent for 
neither party but a surrogate of the law." 
The facts of the case bear out that there was a failure to comply with Rule 64C, "thus 
Plaintiffs did not acquire a lien on the attached property." (Bank of Ephraim v. Davis) 
Therefore, with no attachment, there was not lien until the judgment was recorded in the registry 
of judgments on September 24, 2003 (Addendum 1, pages 476-477). Even if the Houghtons and 
Thomas' had a lien that was excepted by 78-23-3(3), the Declaration of Homestead recorded on 
March 27, 2003 (Addendum 5) is first in time, first in line. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in granting Miller a homestead exemption on property located 
at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. As stated by the trial court, 
"Plaintiffs' argument that a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment (or judgment for that 
matter), filed before the homestead exemption on the subject property was declared, 
comprised the efficacy of the homestead exemption, is as unpersuasive today as it was 
to the Utah Supreme Court twenty five years ago." 
Houghtons and Thomas" have provided nothing to refute this statement, and the facts support the 
court's decision. 
Miller acquired the right to declare the property as a homestead when he obtained title to 
the property. A declaration of homestead was filed to protect the property for the use of Miller's 
family. This was done prior to judgment and prior to the time set for sale. 
Because there was a failure to comply with Rule 64C, U.R.C.P., there was no attachment 
to the property, and therefore, no lien prior to the judgment lien of September 24, 2003. 
Furthermore, the homestead is immune from judicial liens, provided that a formal declaration of 
23 
homestead is made prior to the time set for the sale, unless there is an exception as provided in 
Code Section 78-23-3(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d). There is no exception to defeat Miller's Declaration 
of Homestead. 
Wherefore, Miller and his property are eligible for the homestead exemption, and the trial 
court's decision should be affirmed; and that costs be granted to Miller, the cross-appellee, along 
with any other equitable relief that may be granted. 
N^K 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 2004. 
Glen E. Miller 
94 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Glen E. Miller, certify that on Tfrtfrmkar yOjlsOO1! I caused two copies of the 
attached Cross-Appellee Brief to be served upon Douglas F. White, the counsel for the Cross-
Appellant in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage pre-paid 
to the following address: 
Douglas F. White 
3282 South Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
?s 
Tabl 
FILEL) 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR - H 200^ 
In the Third District Court of Tooele County-
State of Utah 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant-Appel]ee, 
INDEX OF RECORD ON APPEAL 
District Ct. Case #000301127 
Supreme Ct. Case #20040007CA 
Date 
Filed DOCUMENT 
Page 
Numbers 
11/15/00 Complaint 1 - 2 0 
12/01/00 Summons on Return 21 - 22 
12/05/00 Motion to Issue Writ of Attachment Pursuant 23 - 25 
to Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
12/05/00 Verified Affidavit of Kendall R. and 26 - 66 
Marlene Thomas in Support of Motion to 
Issue a Writ of Attachment 
12/05/00 Verified Affidavit of Jerry and Susan 67 - 71 
Houghton in Support of Motion to Issue a 
Writ of Attachment 
01/03/01 Answer 72 - 82 
01/12/01 Amended Motion to Issue Writ of Attachment 83 - 86 
Pursuant to Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 
01/12/01 LIS PENDENS 87 - 88 
02/05/01 Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 89 - 93 
Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Issue Writ of 
Attachment Pursuant to Rule 64 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 
02/05/01 Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's 94 - 95 
Affidavits in Support of Motion for Writ of 
Attachment and for Costs and Attorney Fees 
02/05/01 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 96 - 102 
to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavits in Support 
of Motion for Writ of Attachment and for 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
02/05/01 Affidavit of Residency of Glen E. Miller 103 - 104 
02/23/01 Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's 105 - 107 
Memorandum Opposed to Motion for Writ of 
Attachment 
02/23/01 Supplemental Verified Affidavit of Jerry 108 - 109 
Houghton, Susan Houghton, Kendall R. 
Thomas and Marlene Thomas 
Houghtons & Thomases V Miller Case #000301127 Page 2 
Date Filed Document Page Number 
03/06/01 Notice to Submit for Decision 110 - 111 
03/12/01 Notice of Hrg/Writ of Attachment 112 - 113 
03/19/01 Notice to Atty Atkin Returned 114 - 117 
03/20/01 Notice to Submit for Decision 118 - 120 
03/22/01 Reply to Defendant's Notice to Submit 121 - 125 
for Decision 
03/26/01 Minutes - Hearing Writ of Attachment 126 
04/17/01 Order on Motion for Prejudgment Writ of 127 - 129 
Attachment 
05/07/01 Request for Video 130 
05/18/01 Entry of Appearance 131 - 132 
06/06/01 Return on Writ of Attachment and Notice 133 - 146 
of Writ of Attachment 
06/14/01 Reply to Notice of Proceedings; and 147 - 149 
Motion to Stay Proceedings 
06/20/01 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 150 - 153 
Motion to Stay Proceedings 
06/25/01 Notice of Stay of Proceedings; and 154 - 167 
Motion to Stay Proceedings 
08/28/01 Notice of Deposition 
08/31/01 Subpoena on Return 
08/31/01 Subpoena on Return 
09/05/01 Subpoena on Return 
09/05/01 Subpoena on Return 
09/05/01 Subpoena on Return 
09/10/01 Notice of Unavailability for Taking 
Depositions 
11/14/01 Objections to Subpoenas 
11/14/01 Motion of Non-Party Movants to Quash or 
Modify Subpoenas 
11/14/01 Memorandum in Support of Non-Party Movants 214 - 274 
Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoenas 
11/29/01 Notice of Stay of Proceedings; and Motion 275 - 290 
to Stay Proceedings 
12/03/01 Notice of Stay of Proceedings; and Motion 291 - 306 
to Stay Proceedings 
12/06/01 Second Reply to Second Notice of Stay of 307 - 308 
Proceedings; and Second Motion to Stay 
Proceedings 
01/11/02 Notice of Deposition 309 - 311 
01/30/02 Amended Notice of Depositions 312 - 314 
09/10/02 Notice of Court's Order to Show Cause 315 - 317 
10/03/02 Minutes - Court's Order to Show Cause 318 - 319 
12/0 9/02 Order on Order to Show Cause 32 0 - 321 
02/05/03 Motion to Strike Discovery Cut Off Date 322 - 355 
and Trial Date 
02/05/03 Motion for Summary Judgment 356 - 357 
02/05/03 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 358 - 390 
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
167 -
171 -
178 -
185 -
192 • 
199 • 
206 • 
208 • 
211 -
- 170 
- 177 
- 184 
- 191 
- 198 
- 205 
- 207 
- 210 
- 213 
Houghtons & Thomases V. Miller Case # 000301127 Page 3 
Date Filed Document Page Number 
02/21/03 Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion 3 91 - 3 92 
02/27/03 Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's 393 - 395 
Opposition to Summary Judgment 
02/28/03 Notice to Submit for Decision 396 - 397 
03/24/03 Minute Entry Decision 398 - 399 
04/18/03 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 400 - 404 
04/18/03 Judgment 405 - 407 
04/28/03 Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel 408 - 409 
06/12/03 Request for Hearing, Notification of 410 
06/17/03 Return on Writ of Execution 411 - 416 
06/26/03 Notice of Hearing on Writ of Execution 417 - 418 
07/18/03 Summary Motion to Stay Writ of Execution 419 
07/22/03 Order for Stay of Execution 420 
07/22/03 Request for Transportation to Attend Hrg 421 
07/23/03 Transportation Order to Attend Scheduled Hrg 422 
07/25/03 Motion to Set Aside Judgment 423 - 432 
07/28/03 Affidavit of Defendant Glen E. Miller 433 - 436 
08/04/03 Minutes - Oral Argument 437 
08/07/03 Order Granting Homestead Exemption 438 - 441 
08/08/03 Memorandum for Record 442 - 443 
08/18/03 Request for Video 444 
08/29/03 Memorandum for Record 445 - 454 
09/02/03 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File 455 - 456 
Written Objections to Proposed Order on 
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment 
09/02/03 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File 457 - 458 
Written Objections to Proposed Order on 
Motion to Determine Homestead Exemption 
09/02/03 Letter from Glen Miller 459 
09/04/03 Order Granting Motion for Enlargement of 460 
Time 
09/04/03 Order Granting Motion for Enlargement of 461 
Time 
09/16/03 Notice of Cancellation of Sheriff's Sale 462 - 463 
09/17/03 Motion for Enlargement: of Time zo File 464 - 465 
Written Objections 
09/18/03 Affidavit of Facts Constituting Contempt 466 - 468 
of Court 
09/19/03 Letter from Atty Angerhofer to Inmate 469 
Placement Program 
09/19/03 Letter to the Judge from Glen E. Miller 470 
09/19/03 Objections to Proposed Order on Motion to 471 - 475 
Determine Homestead Exemption 
09/24/03 Notice of Judgment Recorded in the 476 - 477 
Registry of Judgments 
10/02/03 Objections to Plaintiffs1 Order on 478 - 479 
Hearing on Writ of Execution Granting 
Homestead Exemption and Defendant's 
Proposed order 
10/03/03 Letter to the Judge from Atty White 480 
Houghtons & Thomases V. M i l l e r Case #000301127 Page 4 
Date Filed Document Page Number 
10/03/03 Notice to Submit for Decision and/or 481 - 482 
Request for Oral Argument 
10/07/03 Objections to Order to Set Aside Summary 483 
Judgment 
10/07/03 Notice to Submit for Decision and Judicial 484 - 493 
Notice 
10/09/03 Request for Judicial Notice of Homestead 494 - 495 
10/14/03 Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order 496 - 497 
on Writ of Execution Granting Homestead 
Exemption 
10/14/03 Request for Oral Argument 498 - 499 
10/27/03 Notice of Oral Argument 500 - 502 
11/17/03 Verified Affidavit of Glen E. Miller 503 - 506 
11/19/03 Order of Transportation 507 
12/03/03 Notice of Appearance of Counsel 508 - 509 
12/04/03 Minutes - Oral Argument 510 
12/04/03 Order on Hearing on Writ of Execution 511 - 516 
Granting Homestead Exemption 
12/05/03 Copy of Writ of Execution 517 - 520 
12/11/03 Motion to Stay Order Pending Appeal 521 - 524 
12/12/03 Notice of Appeal and Request for Waiver 525 - 527 
of Fees 
12/15/03 Ruling and Order 528 - 531 
12/18/03 Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 532 - 533 
12/23/03 Letter from Glen E. Miller Requesting a 534 - 536 
Transcript 
12/29/03 Request for Hearing - Notification of 537 
Exemption 
02/30/03 Notice of Cross-Appeal 538 - 539 
01/06/04 Return of Service on Writ of Execution 540 - 543 
01/08/04 Letter from Utah Court of Appeals 544 
01/13/04 Minute Entry 545 - 549 
01/13/04 Minute Entry 550 - 551 
01/16/04 Request for Transcripts 552 - 553 
01/22/04 Letter from Utah Court of Appeals 554 
02/17/04 Petition for Rule 65B Extraordinary Relief 555 - 574 
02/24/04 Proof of Publication of Notice of Sheriff's 575 
Sale of Real Property 
02/27/04 Letter from Utah Court of Appeals 576 
03/01/04 Order - Utah Court of Appeals 577 
TRANSCRIPTS 
01/30/04 
01/30/04 
Hearing Held December 4, 2003 578 
Hearing Held August 4, 2003 579 
Tab 2 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 652-0016 
FAX: (801)296-1754 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ) 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ) 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 ; 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ' 
GLEN E. MILLER, ] 
Defendants. ' 
1 ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
} PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF 
> ATTACHMENT 
) Civil No. 000301127 
) Judge David S. Young 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the 
26th day of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. Young, Judge; the Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their attorney, Douglas F. White; the Defendant was not personally present, but 
was represented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having reviewed the pleadings and 
the evidence by proffer of the attorneys, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the 
following Order: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following 
described parcels of real property is hereby granted: 
1 
. D n n FILED j R
° G l b f R i C T COURT TOOELE 
0 I A P R I 7 AM 10: If 8 
FILED BY. 
All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City. 
Serial No 10-8-C-l 
Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41, 
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.9$ feet; 
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27 
Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest coxner of 
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of 
beginning being the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and 
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-42-14 
2. The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the 
above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest 
to another in anyway. 
3. A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear 
before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time 
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of 
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances. 
DATED this /C day of April, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S.YOUNG J 
Third Distrfct Court Judgi 
Parcel No. 1: 
Parcel No. 2: 
Parcel No. 3: 
2 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY 
TO: Gregory P. Hawkins 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this 
of March, 2001, to the following person(s): 
Gregory P. Hawkins 
Attorney for Defendant 
136 South Main Street, 6th Floor 
Salt lake City, Utah 84115 
j g A x O , 
JUDWETE^JSON 
Legal Assistant 
*'* S 
* - '» CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
raiGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
v
 *• 'STRICT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY. STATE 
* '."UTAH _
 y , 
;ATE : ' ' 
DEPUTY*COURT ClfiflK 
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Tab 3 
SERVI.D PERSONAL! ^H. M 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 652-0016 
FAX: (801) 296-1754 
VVTKJN NAMED DEFEND,„,t" AT <=^rr^. g j f c ^ 
TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH 
BY DEPUTY 
AC THIS DAY OF ~^cr 20OJ 
.FRANKA.SCHARMANN 
Shertff, Tooele, Utah 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GLEN E.MILLER, 
Defendants. 
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
Civil No. 000301127 
Judge David S. Young 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
To the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS, the above-entitled Court, on the 26* day of March, 2001, granted the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment; and as such, any and. all interest, right and title of Glen 
' E. Miller in the below described real property is hereby attached. 
WHEREAS, the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, is hereby directed to attach and 
keep safe all of the real pfoperty set forth below until further order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 
64(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Said real property hereby attached is described as follows: 
Parcel No. 1: All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City. Serial No. 10-8-C-l 
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41, Plat "A", Tooele 
City Survey, running thence West 196.96 feet; thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 
196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27 
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest corner ofJBlock 26, Plat 
"A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of beginning being the Southwest 
corner of the Hawker property; and running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 
feet; thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet, thence West 495 feet; thence North 
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No 2-42-14 
Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this h day of April, A.D. 2001. 
Ifiif&tS &$L *z37-6-S-
CLERK 
r ^ OF to£\ 
h CO' 
, _~Vii =, THAT 1 H'S IS A TPU£ COPY CF / 
r
. Z'UP I DOCUMENT ON FILE \U THE TH.RD 
STFiCT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY, STATC 
.y^TE. 
^ \ DZP0TY COURT C1<£R:< 
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Tab 4 
DOUGLAS F WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 652-0016 
FAX: (801)296-1754 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
•»RD DISTRICT COURT TOOELE 
OnPRll MlO'-kB 
FILED BY__ M 
E 1 6 4 9 0 & B 0€>&-7 P O O 
Date 15-JUN-2001 12:00pm 
Fee: 18.00 Cash 
CALLEEN B. PESHELL, Recorder 
SLi&M&Tfls F 
TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GLENE.MLLLER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF 
ATTACHMENT 
Civil No. 000301127 
Judge David S. Young 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the 
26th day of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. Young, Judge; the Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their attorney, Douglas F. White; the Defendant was not personally present, but 
was represented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having reviewed the pleadings and 
the evidence by proffer of the attorneys, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the 
following Order: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following 
described parcels of real property is hereby granted: 
E 1G490G B oes'z P ooae 
Parcel No. 1: All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City. 
Serial No. 10-8-C-l 
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41, 
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.96 feet; 
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27 
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest corner of 
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of 
beginning being the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and 
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-42-14 
2. The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the 
above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest 
to another in anyway. 
3. A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear 
before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time 
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of 
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances. 
DATED this day of April, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVTDS.YOUNGJ ~7) 
Third Distrfct Court Judge-—s 
2 
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NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY 
TO: Gregory P. Hawkins 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this 
2^fday of March, 2001, to the following person(s): 
Gregory P. Hawkins 
Attorney for Defendant 
136 South Main Street, 6th Floor 
Salt lake City, Utah 84115 
J CERTIFY THA) THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THJRD 
DISTRICT COURT. TOOELE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH jr\ fl[ 
DEPUTY( 
DATE.. 
/h>4— 
juej^t 
JUDWETE^SON 
Legal Assistant 
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Tab 5 
Declaration of Homestead 
1. I, Lori Lee Thiriot Miller, claimant, a married woman hereby declare that I am 
entitled to a homestead exemption under Utah Constitution, Article XXII Section 
2. Claimant further states that her spouse has not filed a declaration of homestead. 
3. The'homestead claimed as exempt in this Declaration of Homestead is located 
at 35 8 North 100 East, Tooele, Tooele County, Utah and is more fully described 
to wit: 
Beginning 303 feet, more or less, south of the Northwest corner of block 26, 
Plat "A"^Tooele-City Survey; Tooele City, said point of beginning being the 
Southwest corner of the Hawker Property; and running thence East 504; 
thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence 
West 495 feet; thence North 66.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
4;: The estimated cash value of this real property is $85,000. 
5; vThe;>amount of the homestead claimed is $120,000 as computed as follows: 
Lori;Lee Thiriot Miller, 47, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah 
'•6ten Eugene Miller, 48, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah 
Thofnas Samuel Miller, 21, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele,'Utah 
Angela Miller, 18, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele,-Utah 
Kimberly Miller, 16, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele/Utah 
•Elizabeth Miller, 14, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele,iUtah 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me, ^ A ? | M I ? ^ ShfiFy.n^ 
a Notary Public for the State of Utah, this ^^day^of •' MftflCtJ • , 2003. 
My commission expires ,Q [ Q&n f.w_&f.<Z_ ^ ^ 3 . 
Tab 6 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435) 843-9399 
FAX: (435) 843-9399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ) 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ) 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 ] 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ' 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendants. 
) JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 000301127 
) Judge Randall Skanchy 
COMES NOW, the Court and having considered the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendant's response to it, and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein and good 
cause appearing therefore; the Court now hereby enters the following order and JUDGMENT as 
follows: 
1. There is no genuine issue of material facts in dispute; and therefore, the Plaintiffs are 
entitled to a judgment against the Defendant as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah 
1 
& 
-£B DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 8 2003 
By. 
.TOOELE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk" 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
3. Jerry Houghton and Susan Houghton are granted a judgment, jointly and severally, 
against the Defendant, Glen E. Miller, in the amount of $88,129.00 as of November 30, 2002. Post 
judgment interest to accrue at the contract rates. 
4. Kendall R. Thomas, Marlene Thomas and the 1995 Thomas Family Trust are granted 
a judgment, jointly and severally* against the Defendant, Glen E.. Miller. Post judgment interest to 
accrue at the contract rates. \ ! A ^ U ^ ^ ^ 4 [ %l, aC<t, 2£> < p ^ — 
DATED this J g ^ day of April, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
RAND ALU SKANCHY 
Judge 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY 
TO: LONN LITCHFIELD 
Pursuant to Rule 4.504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
mailed to you to allow you sufficient-tHS t^crfjfe 
3 » " , - N ^ 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on 
this 3rd day of April, 2003, to the following person(s): 
Lonn Litchfield 
ATKIN & HAWKINS 
Attorney at Law 
136 South Main, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
JUD^ETER§ON, Legal Assistant 
3 
Tab 7 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435) 843-9399 
FAX: (435) 843-9399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ) 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ) 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 ) 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ' 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
) Civil No. 000301127 
) Judge Randall Skanchy 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
To the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS, Judgment was rendered in this action by the above Court in said County, on 
the 10th day of April, 2003, against said Defendant, Glen E. Miller, and in favor of said Plaintiffs, 
in the amount of: 
Judgment amount $271,398.00 
Estimated costs of this Writ $ 65.00 
with interest pursuant to judgment contract rates, from the date of judgment until paid, plus after-
accruing costs. 
THESE ARE, THEREFORE, to command you to collect the aforesaitfjudgment, with 
costs, interest, and fees, and to sell enough of the Defendant's real or personal property to satisfy the 
same. This shall be your sufficient warrant for so doing. Within sixty (60) days after your receipt 
of this Writ, return this Writ with a statement and certificate of your doings in completing the 
service. WHEREOF FAIL NOT. 
Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this / day of Aprti; A.D. 2003. 
2 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435) 843-9399 
FAX: (435) 843-9399 
IN THE TOOELE VALLEY JUSTICE'S COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ) 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ) 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 ) 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
GLEN E. MILLER, : 
Defendant. 
I P R A E C I P E 
) Civil No. 000301127 
) Judge Randall Skanchy 
TO THE SHERIFF OF TOOELE COUNTY: 
Pursuant to the Writ of Execution herewith handed you, you are required to levy on and sell 
the following property belonging to the judgment debtor, Glen E. Miller. Said properties are located 
at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah and lot behind 288 North Main (see 
plat map), Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah, respectively; and fiirther described as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: Beginning 303 feet South of the Northwest Corner of Block 26, 
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; 
thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 66.5 
feet to point of beginning, combining T-504 and T-504-1. Containing 0.77 acres. 
Parcel No. 02-42-14. 
PARCELNO. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast Comer of Lot 5, Block 
41, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; running thence West 196.96 feet; thence'North 
43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 435. feet to the point of beginning 
out of 2-57-17. Containing 0.20 acres. Parcel No. 2-57-27. 
DATED this 3o day of April, 2003. 
v 
)UG1AS F. WHITE 
'Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2 
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IN THE 'iHIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s , 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
Case No . 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 2 7 
H e a r i n g 
E l e c t r o n i c a l l y R e c o r d e d on 
A u g u s t 4 , 2003 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
T h i r d D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
APPEARANCES 
F o r t h e P l a i n t i f f : 
F o r t h e D e f e n d a n t : 
DOUGLAS F . WHITE 
3282 S o u t h S u n s e t H o l l o w Dr 
B o u n t i f u l , U t a h 8 4 0 1 0 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 4 3 5 ) 8 4 3 - 9 3 9 9 
GLEN E. MILLER 
( A p p e a r i n g p r o s e ) 
( A d d r e s s n o t p r o v i d e d ) 
(Phone n u m b e r n o t p r o v i d e d ) 
T r a n s c r i b e d b y : B e v e r l y Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 S o u t h W a s h i n g t o n A v e n u e 
P r o v o , Utah 84606 
T e l e p h o n e : (B01) 3 7 7 - 0 0 2 7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-2-
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on August 4, 2003) 
THE COURT: This is the matter of Jerry Houghton versus 
Glen Miller. It's case 000301127. Mr. Miller's motion to set 
aside the writ of — set aside the judgment. So that's where 
we're at. Go ahead. 
MR. MILLER: Your Honor, could I have a pen — a hana 
released so that I might be able to use a pen so that I could 
take notes? 
THE COURT: I'll only do that if my security officers 
indicate that's acceptable. 
MR. MILLER: Also, this is a hearing on the writ of 
execution, or is this a hearing on the motion for dismissal? 
THE COURT: It's a hearing on both. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. So we'll be discussing both at this 
time? 
THE COURT: I think so. 
MR. MILLER: Because — okay. Because I was not told 
that we would be having the hearing on both, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, you've come a long way and it would 
be nice to have you be able to have everything handled today. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. Whatever we — before I — we 
discuss the writ of execution, your Honor, may I ask some 
questions pertaining to the judgment itself? 
THE COURT: No, no. I just want you to present your 
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argument. You know, I've got a busy calendar here. We've got 
a lot of people that need to be heard. 
MR. MILLER: Well, this — 
THE COURT; I need to hear your argument on this 
particular issue so we can go forward. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. I have outlined in the motion to 
dismiss the issues involved. I was never even aware that there 
was a judgment at all ir. zhis case. I had not received any 
notice until I received zhe writ of execution on the 6th of 
June, and so under the summary judgment I had not even been 
notified that zhere was a judgment, that I could respond to the 
judgment or that matter. 
Also, in the wriz of execution there gave an amount 
of the judgmenz of $271,000 that was granted to the plaintiffs. 
I was wondering where thaz figure came from in this particular 
case. 
THE COURT: You know, the way things work here, you 
make 
hear 
want 
like 
an argument and I Listen to ir. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. 
THE COURT: I ar. not here to be questioned. I simply 
your argument. What you may say, then, is the way you'd 
to say that is "and I think that's in error/' or something 
that — 
MR. MILLER: Okay. 
THE COURT: — as opposed to posing some question to me 
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1 about it (inaudible). 
2 MR. MILLER: Okay, your Honor, this is the first time 
3 I've ever done this, so — 
4 THE COURT: Well, you've done a very nice job in terms 
5 of what you've provided the Court. It's been very beneficial 
6 and useful. So you're doing great so far. Just — 
7 MR. MILLER: Okay, thank you, your Honor. Yes, and I'm 
8 scared, too, and it's -just — 
9 THE COURT: No reason to be scared. 
10 MR. MILLER: Okay. Also, the reason I brincr that 
11 point up is that the plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit m 
12 November of 1999, but m January or February of 2000 they 
13 received a judgment on the promissory notes, and that was 
14 already issued m , like I say, in January or February of the 
15 year 2000. 
16 This particular lawsuit, as I understand it, as 
17 I don't have all the paperwork pertaining to it, is a 
18 supplementary one. It's one filed after that against me 
19 personally for fraud, and so that one — and now if this 
20 judgment m this second lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs against 
21 me is for the amount of the promissory note that has already 
22 been resolved under the first lawsuit tnat was — they were 
23 awarded a judgment of in 2000 against LD&B Corporation. 
24 So according to — under the rules of the res judicata 
25 this shouldn't be able to be tried agair. So that is a reason 
-5-
1 for — another reason not mentioned m my motion as to why this 
2 judgment should be set aside. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. White, does your client have a judgment 
4 against Mr. Miller that- precedes this one on these same — 
5 MR. WHITE: No. 
6 THE COURT: — issues? All right. 
7 MR. WHITE: It is against a company called LD&B. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. WHITE: Totally separate. 
10 THE COURT: What I'd indicate to you, Mr. Miller, is 
11 that parties may sue people m their individual and m their 
12 corporate capacities, and maybe that's what occurred. A 
13 judgment has been taken against your corporation or whatever 
14 it was, and I'm not privy to thar, so I don't know. 
15 MR. MILLER: Uh-huh. 
16 THE COURT: And B, subsequently a judgment was taken 
17 against you personally. Maybe in this case based upon — 
18 based upon the allegations of self dealing or not maintaining 
19 a corporation, that you might be subject to these particular 
20 judgments, but regardless of that, the judgment's been entered. 
21 So now we understand that they're not — they're not two 
22 judgments taken against you. So res judicata is not going to 
23 apply. 
24 MR. MILLER: But the promissory notes are exactly the 
25 same, 
-6 
1 THE COURT: It doesn't matter. 
2 MR. MILLER: And that would be a — that would be a 
3 defense that would be raised at a trial. 
4 THE COURT: You see, res judicata, of course, would 
5 mean that you had been sued twice in your individual capacity 
6 for the same debt by the same parties. 
7 MR. MILLER: I was sued in that first one, and the 
8 judgment was issued, though, against LD£3 Management. 
9 THE COURT: All right. I understand your argument 
10 there. 
11 MR. MILLER: Okay. New, I'd like to right now, your 
12 Honor, address the homestead issue that I filed — 
13 THE COURT: Address the service issue for me, please. 
14 That's the most important one. 
15 MR. MILLER: The service issue? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 MR. MILLER: Okay. Z!he only service which I received 
18 was the writ of execution. There was nc other service that I 
19 received. I was not informed of any judgment. I was not 
20 informed of any lawsuit that was pending against me in these 
21 proceedings. I had written my attorney on February 13th and 
22 asked if there had — was anything that was going on. 
23 THE COURT: Now, your attorney unfortunately withdrew, 
24 and so this is where you end up. 
25 THE COURT: And he withdrew, as I understood, m April 
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or — but he never sent me any notification of withdrawal. 
THE COURT: Withdrew. He withdrew on the 25r-n of April 
2003, although I note that no order was entered by a Judge, 
meaning he hadn't officially withdrawn. 
MR. MILLER: Yeah, Mr. White informed me today that 
he had withdrawn. That was the first I had heard. I had 
written — 
THE COURT: Well, he believes he's withdrawn, but until 
an order is executed by the Judge, he hasn't. 
MR. MILLER: And so I have not — I had not received 
anything pertaining to the issues of the case, being able 
to argue against the summary judgment, morion for summary 
judgment. I've outlined in ny motion other elements pertaining 
in the — to have it dismissed as to why it should be disrrJ.ssed 
because I was never informed of the judgment and I was never 
able to provide a defense. 
THE COURT: Well, let r.e indicate something for you 
so you fully understand it. You were served with the initial 
summons in this case. That is, you were served because you had 
retained Counsel, 
while Counsel was 
judgment was file 
opposition to tha 
was heard before 
So wheth 
and Counsel was representing 
representing you, this motion 
d. Your Counsel actually file 
t morion for 
your Counsel 
summary judgment, 
chose to withdraw 
er your Counsel was informing 
you. 
for 
d a 
and 
Indeed 
summary 
response in 
this matter 
you of what's 
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going on, that may or may not have happened, but you had 
representation, whatever it was, through this lawyer, whomever 
he was that you retained, but he was representing you through 
-- up through and including the time this judgment was entered. 
So service on your lawyer is service on you. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. There — 
THE COURT: Go to the homestead issue. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. Yes, your Honor. Okay. As you're 
aware, your Honor, the homestead is a Constitutional creation, 
and as such it's not just a privilege, but an absolure right. 
It's intended to secure and protect the home against creditors 
as a means of support to every family, and that's found in 
Kimball versus Salisbury case. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines a Constitutional 
homestead as a homestead along with its exemption from forced 
sale conferred upon the head cf a household by a State 
Constitution. Article 22, Section 1 of the Utah State 
Constitution outlines that a homestead law needs to be passed. 
So therefore the homestead law itself is found in code Section 
78-23-3. 
Now, the term "homestead" is not defined itself in the 
code section. However, according to the terms of statutory 
construction — you know, we turn to a dictionary, and again in 
Webster's and also in Black's Dictionary — Law Dictionary — 
homestead is defined as the home, the appurtenances, the out-
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and the land surrounding 
person or his family. 
The property located at 3 
principal 
in Tooele 
residence of my 
County Recorder' 
family. 
s Office 
the primary residence of a 
58 North 100 East is the 
The homestead was recorded 
on March 27th, 2003. 
I do not have a copy of that. If my wife is present in 
courtroom she would have a copy o 
that as an official document, your 
THE COURT: Let's just for 
f that if you want to 
Honor. 
this argument assume 
Now, 
the 
view 
that i 
exists. 
MR. MILLER: Okay. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
the exemption statutes are to be liberally construed in favor 
of the debtor to protect him and his family from hardship, and 
that was stated in Russell M. Miller Company versus Given. 
Also, in the Court case Folson versus Asper they 
stated that because homestead is a Constitutional creation, 
all laws thereto must be liberally construed to protect it 
and make it effective for the dependent and the help -- the 
dependent and helpless to insure them shelter and support. 
Again, in Pentagopoiis versus Manning, they said 
that the law should be broadly construed to accomplish its 
beneficent purpose. 
In the case of McMurdie versus Chugg, one of the 
beneficent purposes to the homestead was given when it said 
that the law was to protect rhe land which was designated 
-10-
1 homestead against forced sale for an ordinary judgment lien. 
2 Subsection 3 of the law of Section 78-23-3 clearly 
3 states, "A homestead is exempt from jua_cial lien and from 
4 levy, execution or forced sale." Apply_ng the definition found 
5 in the dictionary about the homestead, :: said it would be the 
6 house, out-buildings and adjoining lane owned and occupied by a 
7 person or family as a primary residence is exempt from judicial 
8 lien and from levy, execution and forced sale. 
9 There are four exemptions that are given to which 
10 a homestead could be levied. One is a statutory lien for 
11 property raxes and assessments on the property. Plaintiffs 
12 judgment is not for those. 
13 A security interest m the property and judicial liens 
14 for debts created for the purchase price of the property. 
15 Again, the plaintiff's judgment is not for that purpose. 
16 Three, judicial liens, which is what theirs is, 
17 obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or 
18 maintenance for dependent children. The_rs is not a judicial 
19 lien for uhe support of dependent children, or maintenance. 
20 Four, consensual liens obtained on debts created by 
21 mutual contract, and there's nothing consensual about the 
22 plaintiff's lien on the property, so that exemption does not 
23 apply there. So none of the exemptions as stated m the law 
24 cover that — the plaintiff's judgment. 
25 Now, up to this point I've onlv talked aoout the 
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1 beneficent purpose which is to provide security and protecting 
2 a family's home against the creditors, but there's another 
3 element of the law, and that is that of the homestead amount. 
4 While the Courts have ruled that the homestead is 
5 protected, they have also stated that a homestead cannot be 
6 used to defeat a lien that's already on rhe property. Okay, 
7 and there is a Court case — and that was in McMurdie versus 
8 Chugg. 
9 Now, there is also a case wnere the Utah Supreme 
10 Court allowed the a sale of the homestead, but still granted 
11 the exemption amount, which — okay, which tends to make the 
12 homestead appear that it is an amount, not the homestead. That 
13 was m the Court case of Gilroy versus Lowe, but the facts of 
14 that case are totally different. 
15 In that case a judgment was awarded against the Lowes, 
16 and then eight years l^ter, upon the execution of that judgment 
17 and after an order had been issued oy the Court to force sale 
18 the property, then they filed the homestead claiming that it 
19 was exempt, and a judgment which was eight years later — 
20 again, after the judgment they filed the nomestead simply as 
21 a means to defeating that judgment aid to preserving their 
22 home, but they were still granted tne horestead amount because 
23 of the homestead law. 
24 THE COURT: And how do you balance this homestead 
25 amount, which is a smail amount — $20,000 m the case of the 
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1 primary residence — against the rest of what might otherwise 
2 be subject to execution? That is, the home itself. 
3 MR. MILLER: That is a very valid point, your Honor, 
4 and I would like to emphasize that point in this — at zhis 
5 time, because the Tenth Circuit Court around 1994 in the case 
6 David Dorsey Distributing versus Sanders stated that a judgment 
7 lien never attaches to the homestead. It never attaches to the 
8 homestead under Utah law. 
9 Now, there's another case called Gisey Walker Company 
10 versus Biggs where again they talk about where the exemption 
11 amount is lower than the value of the property and say that it 
12 could be sold at a forued sale. However, it referred to the 
13 law at that time which was m force, which specifically stated 
14 that a homestead could be levied in excess. That wording has 
15 been dropped from the present statute that there no longer can 
16 be that. 
17 Now, the Courts have had to weigh the differences to 
18 what is the beneficent purpose of the honeszead and what is an 
19 actual use of the homestead m protecting a family and a home 
20 and the people, and m the particular cases where they have 
21 allowed for the execution of the homestead, m each of those 
22 cases the homestead was filed after the judgment, and it was 
23 filed after the writ of execution had been g_ven, and it was 
24 only used as a means to defeat that execution. 
25 However, m other Court cases sucr. as — as I 
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1 mentioned — in McMurdie versus Chugg, it talks that — the 
2 Court ruled that the plaintiff could not assert a lien against 
3 an existing homestead already vested in the defendant. That he 
4 could not do that under the Constitution. Meaning he couldn't 
5 assert the lien against an existing homestead. 
6 It was later ruled that the right to claim a homestead 
7 exemption is a right that the head of family may assert to 
8 prevent sale under execution of his homestead at any time 
9 before sale of the premises, unless the claim against such 
10 property has been previously asserted and actually adjudicated 
11 against him. That was found in Utah Builder's Supply Company 
12 versus Gardner. So what they have — the Court has ruled that 
13 they can assert that any time prior to the sale as long as it 
14 hasn't been adjudicated. 
15 Now, as I stated, in all of the cases where the 
16 homestead was executed — and they use it in bankruptcy, as I 
17 understand, a lot. I'm not familiar with that, but they have 
18 used that, and the Court of Appeals has also said that it' s not 
19 fair for a person to continue living in their home and enjoy 
20 that living, and then declare bankruptcy while all of those 
21 other creditors have been left to hang dry out in the wind, and 
22 defraud them of that money. 
23 Now, finally, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in Payson 
24 Exchange Savings Bank versus Teachen that the levy of execution 
25 upon a homestead is not voidable, but it's absolutely void. 
-14-
1 Now, in our case the homestead was prepared and filed prior to 
2 any judgment and without any atrempt on our part or the parr of 
3 my wife to defeat any existing lien. 
4 THE COURT: When did you say the date of that filing 
5 was? 
6 MR. MILLER: The date of the filing was the 26th day 
7 of March 2003. That was the dare that she filed — or 27th day 
8 of March. She signed it on the 2 6tQ. She would have done it 
9 sooner, but the property was in such bad condition from renters 
10 having been in there and left ir unsecured and such, that she 
11 spent about four, five months trying to prepare the house to 
12 make it just habitable. So as soon as it was habitable and 
13 she could move in, she filed the declararion of homestead. Not 
14 in an attempt to defeat any judgment. Nor in an attempt to 
15 escape any creditors, but as a protection so that she might 
16 have a place to live. 
17 We had a house previously. A fire burned it. It was 
18 then foreclosed upon, as the insurance company or the bank 
19 refused to allow the money ro fix the house to be released. I 
20 don't know all of the details and the parriculars because I was 
21 in prison at the time that that occurred, but we did lose that. 
22 So after that time, we looked and this house was available 
23 for her to move into, and she prepared it ro move into. Now, 
24 again, as I said, it was nor — it was to provide stability to 
25 her, to provide stability for the family, and to provide for 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
her. 
Court, 
of an 
for my 
Then 
your 
Drder 
wife 
another event has just recent! 
Honor, where this past ' 
of 
Lo 
separate maintenance 
ri, and it granted to 
rhursday 
Ly 
i 
from this 
her the 
occurred 
received 
m 
a 
Court which 
use of the P^ 
-15-
this 
copy 
was 
operty 
located at 358 North 100 East as an award of alimony for her, 
and in reviewing the exemption statute, as well as Rule 69 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, property thar is necessary 
for support, such as alimony — and that is found m 78-23-6 — 
child support, et cetera is exempt from execution. T m s home 
was given to her by the Court as alimony for her to live in. 
Again, another reason not just for the homestead, but for the 
alimony as well. Therefore, this also creates an exemption 
from levy of the property located there at 358 North M a m . 
Now, there is a second piece of property listed m 
the (inaudible) that was a smaller, little lot "chat is located 
at about 280 South Mam Street here m Tooele. This is not 
a primary residence, so therefore the execution amount: of 
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1 it would also exempt it from levy. If the Court deems that it 
2 should be levied under this case and then the homestead granted 
3 based under the exemption amount for that, then, you know, I 
4 have no objection :o having that property sold at that point — 
5 at this time, is my — 
6 THE C0UR7: Is there a homestead exemption that's been 
7 declared and filed on that property? 
8 MR. MILLER: As I understand, your Honor, yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
10 MR. MILLER: So in summary — 
11 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. (Inaudible). I will now 
12 hear from Mr. White. 
13 MR. MILLER: Can I make a summary, your Honor? 
14 THE COURT: No. 
15 MR. MILLER: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: I think you've pretty well (inaudible). 
17 MR. WHITE: Thank you, your Honor, and I compliment 
18 Mr. Miller for doing his homework on this case. I would like 
19 to add a couple of facts that he has left out. In particular 
20 he has indicated that the law is that the homestead exemption, 
21 as powerful as it night be cannot be used to offset or take 
22 preference to a lien that's already recorded on the property. 
23 I read most of the cases that he cited. I really don't have 
24 much dispute. His interpretation I think is a little off on a 
25 few of them, but let me just indicate a couple of facts to the 
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1 Court, and I think that we can straighten that out. 
2 Number one, as 10 his question about the judgment of 
3 $271,000, if Mr. Miller adds up m e amounrs owed to my clients, 
4 which are in the judgment, Jerry Houghton and Sue Houghton were 
5 granted a judgment jomrly and severely of $88,129. Mr. Thomas 
6 and Mrs. Thomas, Marlene and Kendall, were granted a judgment 
7 of $183,269, which roughly figured $271,000 with the interest 
8 up to that point m tire. 
9 Addressing the motion to set aside the judgment, I 
10 don't believe anything m there is justification at this point 
11 in time to have it set aside. Lie Court correctly stated that 
12 all of the commumcaiicr.s and pleadings and whatnot that went 
13 on before were sent to Mr. Atkm, his attorney. The Court 
14 cited correctly that Mr. Atkm rade a response to the summary 
15 judgment. The Court granted it under Rule 4.501. There was no 
16 irregularities there m a r I am aware of. Mr. Atkm withdrew 
17 about two weeKs later and since m a t time I've been sending 
18 everything to Mr. Miller. 
19 THE COURT: An^ I can make that ruling now. That is, 
20 I'll deny the motion m set aside the judgment based upon non-
21 service, given the fact rhat Counsel was present at the time, 
22 retained by Mr. Miller, and indeed filed motions m opposition 
23 to this question aboui judgment. 
24 MR. WHITE: Tnank you. Now, addressing the homestead 
25 issues, Mr. Miller has reen convicted of defrauding abour. 200 
-18-
1 people to the tune of about: 8 or $9,000,000. My judgments are 
2 part and parcel of that. The reason the summary judgment was 
3 in fact filed in the case originally was because he pled guilty 
4 to 10 or 11 counts of fraud. 
5 That conviction was entered in this Court through 
6 the summary judgment process, and hence, he is personally 
7 responsible for those amounts. I'm sure that he may not 
8 understand that amount. I -hink that's the basis of his res 
9 juste type of res judicata argument, but I think the Court 
10 will note that that is not exactly how that rule works. In 
11 fact, the criminal case in -hat matter has also ordered 
12 restitution, and any one of those defendants purportedly ai 
13 some point in time may go afrer his property. 
14 Here's the facts rhat rhe Court: ought to know, that 
15 I'm sure that Mr. Miller is not aware of. First of all, when 
16 we filed — or I filed the complaint for the Houghtons and the 
17 Thomases, we also filed and obtained a motion for a prejudgment 
18 writ of attachment because cf the allegations of fraud, and 
19 because Mr. Miller had filed and recorded with the County 
20 Recorder's Office a document indicating that he was no longer 
21 to be considered a resident of the Stare of Utah, and because 
22 he was charged with fraud, that gave Judge Young the basis to 
23 go ahead and grant a writ of attachment on the property rhat — 
24 THE COURT: When was thar writ issued? 
25 MR. WHITE: Your Honor, the morion was filed in 
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17*h 
IT: 
and 
currently 
residing m at 871 East Upland Drive, the 358 North house, and 
the little piece of property that there's nothing on. It's 
virtually a weed patch in an alleyway. 
We know that, and I purport to ihe Court that those 
were the properties that I worked with tne SEC attorneys to 
exclude from their case m Salt Lake. They did not trace any 
funds of his fraud to those properties, and those properties 
were solely in his name. Not even his wife's name were on 
them. 
So we asked the Court m this County to issue that 
writ. Because of all of the problems that Mr. Miller had, 
we wanted to make sure that those weren' t deeded away or 
squandered away somehow in between. 
Now, that becomes of critical importance. I might 
add, the writ of attachment — that's the order, the writ of 
attachment whicn was filed with the Court as well. 
THE COURT: You're saying this prejudgment writ of 
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bemg 
the 
meaning of that. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. WHITE: I'm net saying that he did that, but I am 
citing a corpus juris secundum m which it states, "Obligations 
existing prior to rhe establishment of the homestead right will 
not be defeated wr.ere the debtor subsequently claimed that the 
premise was his homestead." In fact, that case cited is the 
Chugg case, which is a Utah case. 
It further 
the exemption canno 
states that the rule — excuse me — that 
t be claimed as against valid liens which 
have attached to tne premises before they are impressed with 
the homestead chara 
contract or by oper 
cter, wr.ether such liens are obtained by 
ation of law. 
I would suggest to tne Court, and I have a reference 
for that, the rules 
by — liens created 
THE COURT: 
MR. WHITE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. WHITE: 
applied m these cases of liens are created 
by attachment. I have — 
Of course, this is a post-judgment — 
Yes. 
— attachment. 
And I have a case en that as well. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. WHITE: The Chugg case, which is an older case, 
3 simply states that existing liens on property cannot be 
4 defeated by subsequently claiming the property is a homestead. 
5 Now, that's important because what Mr. Miller said, he was 
6 living, his wife was living, all his dependents were living at 
7 8 91. There was a fire. They never fixed it up. Whatever the 
8 — it was later foreclosed upon. 
9 In fact, several months prior to that time he called 
10 me and asked me if I would subrogate our preattachment judge 
11 — or lien, so that he could go ahead and refinance the house. 
12 I agreed to do that. He tells me today for the first time 
13 that that actually never did take place, but we did sign the 
14 documents and whatnot, in fact, to do that. So our lien was on 
15 that house when he was living there with his wife and with his 
16 dependents. 
17 He tells me today he was actually incarcerated on 
18 March 27th, 2002. Now, that date's important for obvious 
19 reasons. Our lien was against the house April 17"h, 2001, a 
20 year before he even went to jail, and he was still residing in 
21 that house. The house caught fire six months later, or seven 
22 months later in December, and in fact it was foreclosed on 
23 after that. 
24 Now, the important part is this. Mrs. Killer — well, 
25 let's make this point first. Mr. Miller has never occupied 
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1 the premises. 
2 THE COURT: Right, and she wasn't occupying the 
3 premises. 
4 MR. WHITE: And sne wasn't occupying the premises and 
5 she took occupancy approximately about three months ago, in 
6 May. 
7 MR. MILLER: No. 
8 MR. WHITE: May, June, July, approximately three months 
9 ago she took occupancy. He told me that they starred fixing it 
10 up sometime last September. It doesn't matter which date you 
11 take. The lien was still on there two years ago, and that lien 
12 trumps the homestead filing of March. There's no doubt about 
13 it. 
14 THE COURT: Is it the Chugg case that you used for 
15 support on this, or is it some other case for a prejudgment 
16 writ of attachment? 
17 MR. WHITE: That's another case, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Okc.y. While — I'd like to cite one other 
19 one before I get to that, on the occupancy, because that is 
20 interrelated with it. The Sanders versus Sanders case, which 
21 is a Utah case, specifically talks about occupancy and the 
22 homestead, and I'm quoting, "It is the occupancy of the 
23 premises that gives rise ro the homestead claim." They must 
24 occupy it in order to make the claim. 
25 The prejudgment writ is the case of Ephra.m versus 
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and I'm quoting 
issuance and 
creditor was 
constructive 
seizure by the sheriff encumbered the property with the lien 
of attachment and inhibited defendant' s right to dispose or 
encumber of its assets." 
Now, I can tell you in this case they did let the 
homestead come in, but only because the sheriff didn't do 
the service correctly, and they got rid of the lien, but the 
premise — the principal is the same, that that is a lien that 
would in fact be first in time, first in right, and that's the 
basis of that case. 
Furthermore ou that case it says, "The prejudgment 
remedy of attachment allows the deprivation of the property. 
The debtor's property is therefore subject to the principals 
embodied," and it goes on. 
Now, let me talk about the smaller piece of property. 
There's a small piece of property over cff cf Main. It's only 
access is through a back alleyway. It is 43 feet by 190, I 
believe. Also in agreement with Mr. Miller that thai: case or 
that — there's not a house on it. 
Although the code allows people ro select in more than 
one location, the cases are very clear or. that, that in fact 
the property, if it's appurtenant to — doesn't mean attached 
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1 to. Could be in different areas — has to be m some way 
2 related to the maintenance or the support of the family. 
3 This little piece of property is in the back of an 
4 alleyway. It's a weed patch right now. It should have been 
5 oiled over. Mr. Miller had an interest in the building that: 
6 attaches this property that the SEC took and it's behind 
7 another person's house right now. It has never been leased 
8 for money. It's never been rented for money. There is no way 
9 possible to claim in either instance that this comes under the 
10 homestead exemptions, =md we would ask the Court that it no: be 
11 included. 
12 Now, Mr. Miller in his declaration actually filed by 
13 his wife — the Court have a copy of that with his motion — 
14 claims the house is worth $85,000. Our judgment is $260,000. 
15 Even if the Court found that there was some homestead exemption 
16 there, my clients would be entitled to the excess amount. To 
17 that there is no question. 
18 I do challenge Mrs. Miller's calculation. The current 
19 statute which was amended m 2000 allows, and only allows 
20 $20,000 per individual. Now, if individual is defined as tne 
21 credit — or the debtor, which Mr. Miller is, not Mrs. Miller, 
22 then they're really only entitled in my view to $20,000, but in 
23 fairness and candidness to the Court as well, I found one ca.se 
24 that said if she was m possession of it, even though she's not 
25 on the title of it, m the liberal construction of it, the 
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1 Courts would probably gran her an exemption as well, giving 
2 them 40, totally maximum, out she did not take possession of 
3 the house, and mark it or impress it with the homestead until 
4 after that house caught fire and was foreclosed on. Clearly 
5 about two years difference. 
6 I observed the house before I filed the motion in 
7 November of 2000. It was totally dilapidated, had been an 
8 older rental house, the doors in the front and the back were 
9 totally open on it. No one was residing there, really, at all, 
10 and I don't know that anybody's been in there since they've 
11 tried to go in and fix it ^p now for her. 
12 The point there cemg at the time our prejudgment 
13 lien was filed, it was nor a homestead to the Millers, period. 
14 Likewise, the little piece of property in the alleyway was not 
15 either, and that should nor be considered as a homestead as 
16 well. 
17 I have with me tcday and I would proffer as testimony 
18 an attorney that deals wit.i these exemptions m bankruptcy 
19 Court routinely, and he is Mr. Kurt Morris, he would hear — 
20 he is here and he would testify that the exemption is $40,000 
21 max per household. 
22 What they did is calculate $20,000 per individual, but 
23 they included in their calculation all the children. Under the 
24 new statute amendments of 2000 that's no longer permissible. 
25 What they did is increase tne exemption from $10,000 to $20,000 
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1 and basically took the kids out. The kids were out actually a 
2 little bit before that, but nevertheless, that's the maximum. 
3 He's claimed 100 — or she's claimed $120,000, and 
4 that can't be done under that statute, and I would cite for 
5 that 78-23-3(2) (a) (l) , which indicates there is a $40,000 
6 maximum exemption there. I would also cite the Homeside 
7 versus Miller case, which indicates the maximum would be 
8 $40,000. 
9 So all in all, your Honor, we have a very valid 
10 prejudgment writ of attachment. It's that which we wish to 
11 proceed on when this was started. I, have a copy of — maybe 
12 I gave IT: to you — the title report. Did you have that, your 
13 Honor? 
14 THE COURT: Oh, yes, I do. The list of lien holders 
15 and — 
16 MR. WHITE: Showing that — yeah. Showing that the 
17 writ was filed and recorded with the courthouse about two years 
18 before tnis house ever came on the radar screen as far as being 
19 a Homestead Act, and I would suggest to the Court that the 
20 Court rule in fact that the prejudgment writ of attachment is 
21 not affected by the Homestead Act. My clients have the right 
22 to sell this house and the other little piece of property m an 
23 attempt to try and recoup some of their $271,000. 
24 I appreciate Mr. Miller's response to this matter, but 
25 I think that he just doesn't understand the fact that m 
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Utah, first in time, first in right. I den't see any other 
reasonable interpretation of the time periods and the way the 
law works with liens and homesteads that I could suggest to the 
Court that would construe that statute any other way, and we 
would ask the Court to permit us to go ahead, readvertise and 
go ahead with the sell. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is what the Court's going to 
do, based upon the arguments today. 
MR. MILLER: Can I get — your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: May I add something to what he has said? 
THE COURT: How much of a something do you want to add? 
MR. MILLER: Well, some of the things that he stated as 
facts that I'd like to clarify and — 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's make it — let's make it 
quick. 
MR. MILLER: Okay, he stated that Z have been convicted 
of defrauding people. That is not correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, you pled guilty to — 
MR. MILLER: I 
defrauding any people. 
The 
it 
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1 that said "restitution as necessary." There was no amount 
2 of restitution ordered. 38 — or 78-38 — or 77-38 (a)-302 
3 specifies how to determine restitution. I have not agreed to 
4 any amount of restitution in that case. There are issues in my 
5 affidavit which would address that, if the Court would want me 
6 to go over it now or not as far as being responsible. 
7 The law states that if the criminal conviction 
8 specifically assigns liability that is applicable in a civil 
9 case. The things which I pled guilty to, I did not plead 
10 guilty, and in my plea I did not agree to pay restitution to 
11 all of the victims "chat had been listed and had been talked to 
12 by the prosecutor. 
13 In my plea agreement I agreed to state, and it is 
14 stated in the plea agreement that I would make restitution 
15 to the parties of the lawsuit. The parties in the lawsuit 
16 were the State of Utah and Glen E. Miller. I agreed to that 
17 restitution for the fact that that is who the parties were. 
18 In the preliminary hearing I was questioning Mr. Houghton 
19 pertaining to the loss of money and how he had gotten a 
20 judgment, and the Judge said, uMr. Miller, Mr. Houghton is not 
21 a plaintiff in that, and you are not to discuss loss of money." 
22 THE COURT: Yes, but Mr. Miller, you have to understand 
23 that individual parties can't bring criminal actions against 
24 people. The State does, and the State represents the people. 
25 MR. MILLER: I understand, but this is — this case, 
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I have 
victims 
ere still 
pertaining to the restitution amount. The prejudgment writ of 
attachment, let's — okay. My wife moved into the house in 
March, okay? Which was prior to the post-judgment time. The 
judgment was not awarded until April 10th. I did not even know 
until, like I said, I received the writ of execution, that 
there was even a judgment. 
A prejudgment writ of attachment, while I am not fully 
versed in title and claims, that is a pre-writ. That is not a 
lien that has been adjudicated, as was stated in — against the 
property until April 10th, when that claim would become official 
and adjudicated. 
I would also like to say that, you know, this — in 
this case to awarding the execution of the writ of execution, 
and continuing on wirh that, is just like having a person who 
gives up 20 years of her life to have — raise a family, to 
raise — to support her husband, and then all of a sudden he is 
— you know, he abandons her, and if he abandons her and then 
she is left with nothing, and then they come in and sell the 
house which she has and has been awarded by this Court as 
alimony, to kicking her out on the street and saying, "Here is 
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1 $40,000, whatever, for your inconvenience, and we're sorry " 
2 Furthermore, it does authorize that the wife, and the 
3 spouse may assert the homestead cla.m as well, on behalf of the 
4 husband and the family, m Section 12. I think I have a copy 
5 of the — 
6 THE COURT: Well, the starve is quite clear that the 
7 maximum amount is $40,000. 
8 MR. MILLER: Yes, but the statute is also verv clear 
9 — and the Tenth Circuit Court ma King it also clear that a writ 
10 of — or that a judgment of judicial lien does not attach to a 
11 homestead, and that a homestead, nor a homestead amount, is not 
12 subject to the levy, as also is trie alimony as well. 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay, thank you, Mr. Miller. As 
14 to the motion to set aside the judgrent, I've already ruled 
15 on that particular issue. Mr. Wnite, if you'll prepare the 
16 order. 
17 This Court's going to fine that the maximum amount 
18 per household is $40,000 m this case. So I'd limit any 
19 right of homestead to $40,000. I'll also find for purposes 
20 of findings that the writ of attachment was filed somewhere 
21 in the neighborhood of two years prior to the filing of the 
22 homestead lien. 
23 Be that as it may, the Cert's going to take at 
24 least the opportunity to look at Epnraim versus Davis and 
25 Sanders versus Sanders to see what it says associated with a 
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prejudgrnent writ of attachment acting as the appropriate lie-
that might otherwise be reflected in the homestead exemption. 
So that I might make a determination associated with whether 
or not a writ of attachment, as you have represented it to ce, 
acts m the case of cutting off any claim for a homestead 
exemption. I'm going to ask Ms. Walton ultimately to look at 
that particular issue. 
So I will give that file to you to check. I know rr.at 
probably gives you, Mr. White, some heartburn associated wii-
under advisement, s m c a you and I have a matter that's under 
advisement that we've been attempting to get in touch with yoa 
about on that other matter; Iverson versus Iverson. 
MR. WHITE: Yes. 
(Court addresses issue unrelated to this case.) 
THE COURT: I do understand that it is a matter that is 
still on my desk and it will be off my desk by the end of tr.is 
week, as well as this one. So Mr. Miller, I appreciate your 
arguments today. I would also say that I appreciated reading 
your materials, because it was well done. 
You've represented yourself better than the lawyer .<r.o 
you asked to represent you, but I held the motion to set asice 
a judgment, I denied that motion based upon the fact that yc_ 
had a Counsel representing you. Whether he was communicating 
24 or not communicating with you at that time, he was still a 
25 lawyer of record who had also filed an objection to this ver\ 
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1 motion, and simply didn't keep you in that particular loop. 
2 On the issue associated with the writ of execution, 
3 I've taken that issue under advisement, having limited the 
4 upper amount of $40,000 to it, to simply whether or not the 
5 writ of attachment exists. 
6 As to the other property, that property is subject to 
7 execution, the smaller parcel, based upon the arguments of 
8 Counsel today. So the only issue that I have is whether or not 
9 having looked at Chugg and Sanders a prejudgment writ of 
10 attachment is firs:: in time over a homestead exemption. 
11 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, what about pertaining to the 
12 exemption for alimony? 
13 THE COURT: I've ruled on that. My ruling is it's 
14 not appropriate or applicable based upon the way I read the 
15 statute. Okay, thank you. 
16 MR. MILLER: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 I (Hearing concluded.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss . 
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record, and Therefore, the nane associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 29th day of January 
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February 24, 2004 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN : 
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, : 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 : ORDER GRANTING 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, : HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
Plaintiff, : 
: Case No. 000301127 
vs. : 
GLEN E. MILLER, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant, : 
This matter came on for hearing on various motions on August 4,2003. Mr. 
Douglas F. White representing plaintiffs and Glen E. Miller appearing pro se. After a 
review of the pleadings, case law, and argument of the parties, the court finds and orders 
as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. A prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the real property in 
question and was granted on March 26,2001. 
2. A judgment was entered on April 10,2003 against Glen Miller in this matter. 
3. Lori Miller, the wife of defendant, filed a declaration of homestead on the subject 
property on March 26,2003, and she either took occupancy of the property in March or 
May of 2003. 
-2-
4. A Writ of Execution was issued on May 1, 2003, and a sale of the property 
subject to execution was scheduled for July 23, 2003. 
5. Defendant filed a request for hearing on the Writ of Execution and the court 
ordered a stay of execution, pending hearing on July 22,2003. 
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
— m -
The court notes that the case of Sanders v. Cassitv. 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978) is 
dispositive on the issue of whether a homestead exemption may defeat a pre-existing Writ 
of Attachment or other judgment on the property claimed under the homestead exemption. 
Under the statutory authority of Utah Code Annotated 78-23-1 et. seq., and the Sanders 
decision, a homestead exemption may be made at any time after judgment and before sale. 
Plaintiffs argument that a prejudgment Writ of Attachment, (or judgment for that matter) 
filed before the homestead exemption on the subject property was declared, compromised 
the efficacy of the homestead exemption, is as unpersuasive today as it was to the Utah 
Supreme Court twenty five years ago. That court opined back then that " . . . the 
homestead exemption is immune from judgment lien, execution or forced sale, providing a 
formal declaration of the existing exemption is made prior to the time set for sale or 
execution," Id. at 426 (emphasis added). Furthermore, even though the Millers may not 
have been in occupancy on the property at the time of the prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment, or at the time of judgment, is irrelevant, as the statute neither requires such in 
order to declare the exemption and Utah case law recognizes that occupancy is 
unnecessary. Rich Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, 385 P.2d 155 (Utah 1963) 
-3-
ORDER 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the subject property, 358 North 100 
East, Tooele, Utah, is subject to the homestead exemption exercised by the Millers and 
exempted up to $40,000.00 per Utah Code Annotated 78-23-3(2)(b)(ii). Mr. White to 
prepare the order consistent with this decision. 
Dated this 1 day of August, 2003. 
Randall N. SKanchy 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^\ r~ 
JERRY HOUGHTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant. 
i ,-A-W'r 
Case No. 000301127 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
December 4, 2003 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RANDALL N, SKANCHY 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
B 
For the Plaintiff; 
For the Defendant: 
DOUGLAS F. WHITE 
3282 South Sunset Hollow Dr. 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (435)843-9399 
JUDSON T. PITTS 
(Address not provided) 
(Phone number not provided) 
Transcribed by: Eeverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
19C9 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-0027 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on December 4, 2C93) 
3 THE COURT: All right. We'll call the matter of 
4 Jerry Houghton and others versus Glen E. Miller. Iz is case 
5 000301127. Counsel, if you'll come forward, make your entries 
6 of appearance. 
7 MR. WHITE: Douglas White for the plaintiff. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. PITTS: Judson Pitts. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Pitts, this is — 
11 MR. PITTS: 9946, for the defendant. 
12 THE COURT: I think this is your motion. So you may 
13 proceed. 
14 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, at this time, again, with the 
15 understanding that I was retained just a little while ago, and 
16 I've looked over the motions, the response to motions, I was 
17 unclear as to the scope as to all that would be discussed 
18 during the hearing today. 
19 THE COURT: Well, then you're not alone, because so am 
20 I. 
21 MR. PITTS: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: But I know that we have voluminous — I 
23 believe wnat is at issue today is the objection to plaintiff's 
24 order. 
25 MR. PITTS: Okay. 
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1 I THE COURT: But I know there are other motions that 
2 have been filed, including a motion or request thar I take 
3 judicial notice of various items. 
4 MR. PITTS: Sure. 
5 THE COURT: That may simply be a reflection of somebody 
6 trying to practice law who has never been through law school 
7 training, but having said that, seemed to have done a pretty 
8 good job of representing himself so far. 
9 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I'd like to beg the Court's 
10 indulgence at this time for my client that he might have one 
11 hand free so that he can take some notes. 
12 THE COURT: That's not up to me. That's up to the 
13 officers in the courtroom today. 
14 OFFICER: If it's up to us, the answer is no. 
15 THE COURT: What I ask is do you have any objection to 
16 that? If you don't, then — well, let's just do this. Let's 
17 free one hand, whichever hand he uses to write with. 
18 MR. MILLER: R^ght. 
19 THE COURT: I've always considered the security of the 
20 courtroom to be not the province of the Judge but the province 
21 of the security officers in the courtroom. 
22 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, it appears that my client, 
23 the defendant, has issued a motion or made a motion ro object 
24 to the levy and the execution that has been issued by the 
25 plaintiffs in this case, based upon his — the granting by 
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1 this Court of the homestead exemption back on August 4"-h, I 
2 believe it was, of this year, in that hearing when that came 
3 before the Court. We would like at this time to go ahead and 
4 make some oral argument about that to clarify our position. 
5 THE COURT: Go ahead, certainly. You might best be 
6 served by standing at the lectern so that — 
7 MR. PITTS: (Inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: — for purposes of the record it would be 
9 better recorded that way. 
10 MR. PITTS: My client has gone ahead and moved in 
11 this case according to the Utah Constitutional provision or. 
12 homestead, Article 22, Section 1, your Honor, and also pursuant 
13 to Utah Code 78-23-3, that the statutory language in that 
14 situation be read liberally — be construed liberally, to allow 
15 him to exclude his homestead. 
16 Now, I understand there are more than — there is more 
17 than one parcel of land that is involved in this case that he 
18 would like to exclude his homestead and also the other parcel 
19 of land using various statutory provisions from forced sale and 
20 the execution of levy in this case. 
21 Your Honor, we would go ahead and enter in argument 
22 at this time that the provisions of the code that provide — 
23 apply to the homestead exemption as it is set forth apply in 
24 a setting that is for bankruptcy law. 
25 We would like to go ahead and move at this time thai: 
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1 the homestead definition as it is put forth in statutory 
2 language should be interpreted differently in this situation, 
3 should be distinguished from the context of a bankruptcy 
4 proceeding. 
5 That the statutory language should be read more 
6 liberally to protect the actual physical structure of rhe 
7 homestead in this situation, as differentiated from the 
8 bankruptcy. 
9 Now, it's my understanding in a bankruptcy proceeding 
10 that it is common practice, your Honor, to go ahead and grant 
11 the exemption up to $20,000 per person in the household, which 
12 would give a total monetary exemption on the homestead of 
13 $40,000, and that the rest of the — the actual physical 
14 structure would be subject to a creditor's lien, and would be 
15 able to be sold at execution in a sheriff's sale; and that the 
16 proceeds from the sale up to $40,000 would be given over to the 
17 defendants or the debtors in that situation. 
18 We enter an argument at this time that that does 
19 not apply in this proceeding. That this proceeding is a 
20 Constitutional proceeding, based on an older law and an older 
21 law and an older interpretation of homestead outside of that 
22 context of bankruptcy, and that the entire structure at this 
23 time is not subject to a forced sale. 
24 We use case law, your Honor, to back up and to support 
25 our point. First off I'd like to say Russell M. Miller Company 
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versus Given, the citation in that case, your Honor — 
THE COURT: I have it. 
MR. PITTS: You have the citation. That exemption 
statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor 
to protect he and his family. We also would like to cite 
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Folson versus Asper as one of the first cases to deal with 
homestead at the beginning of this century, that all laws of 
the homestead should be liberally construed to protect it and 
make it effective for the dependent and the helpless, to insure 
their shelter and their support. 
Now, defendant recognizes at this point, your Honor, 
that the exemption as it was created and cut out has changed 
over time by legislative change, but we would also like to 
recognize that the amount — monetary amount of the homestead 
exemption in times past historically have been enough to cover 
the value of most homesteads. 
As that law has evolved, your Honor, we understand 
that the price most homesteads in equity has exceeded the 
value of the homestead exemption for Utah. I understand 
in a national context that this state has one of the lowest 
thresholds of any state in the country at this time monetarily 
for a homestead exemption. 
Regardless of that argument, and also recognizing, 
your Honor, that the homestead exemption law in this state 
was altered just six years ago in 1996 by the legislature, 
-7 
1 that the values were changed, that this was dealt with by the 
2 legislature in terms of legislative history, again, the last 
3 40 years of homestead lav/ have been almost exclusively caught 
4 up in creditor/debtor situations in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
5 Now, one of the cases that I wanted to cite as well, 
6 your Honor, that I think will help clarify my argument, will 
7 be — well, first off, I -wanted to go ahead and ask the Court 
8 to take notice of the definition of Black's Law Dictionary on 
9 homestead. That is that the house out-buildings and adjoining 
10 land owned and occupied by a person or family as a primary 
11 residence, Black's Law Dictionary speaks of the house, the 
12 out-buildings, the adjoining land as being a part of the 
13 homestead. 
14 We argue that when the cases and the statutory 
15 language that has been set forth in not only Black's Law 
16 Dictionary, but also in the statute 78-23-3, when it talks 
17 about a homestead being exempted, we contend that the exemption 
18 that that statutory language is talking about isn't the 
19 monetary value that is exempted from the forced sale. 
20 THE COURT: If the statute so designates, it's only 
21 exempt up to a certain monetary value. 
22 MR. PITTS: We understand that, but we would like to 
23 submit that that is in the bankruptcy proceeding. We would 
24 like to submit that that applies only to bankruptcy cases and 
25 it does not apply to situations where a debtor has not filed 
1 for bankruptcy and is not in the course of liquidating his 
2 assets to satisfy all lien creditors that have come against 
3 him. 
4 THE COURT: Has there been any case in the State of 
5 Utah limiting this particular statute only to a bankruptcy 
6 proceeding? 
7 MR. PITTS: The cases that I have, your Honor, to cite 
8 in that context — of course, the older cases that I've already 
9 provided for; Folson and I'd also present McMurray versus Chugg 
10 as a case that was not in that context. They talked about the 
11 beneficient purpose of securing and protecting family's home 
12 against creditors. 
13 Okay. Now, I would submit to the Court that the 
14 language that's used in those cases — and these are outside 
15 of bankruptcy proceeding cases — talk about securing the home 
16 against attack by creditors. It talks about protecting minor 
17 children. It talks about giving support to those people. 
18 THE COURT: The statute itself has a cap at which that 
19 protection ends, and that cap is set forth in a monetary value. 
20 MR. PITTS: Okay. Well, Your Honor, the basis of my 
21 argument revolves around this being a property interest, as a 
22 Constitutional matter, and not being an interest in a monetary 
23 value. I would like to make the argument that due process 
24 attaches in this kind of a situation. It would be actually a 
25 violation of due process in a Constitutional manner to go ahead 
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1 and take away the physical home, the physical structure, in 
2 granting this exemption. 
3 My client and his spouse did apply for a homestead 
4 exemption in this case, and in that context they were asking 
5 for the monetary relief m that situation, but what my client 
6 also moved for in that situation, he moved for the protection 
7 of a due process protection. A Constitutional protection 
8 that's given under the United — or the Utah Constitution. 
9 Now, I understand that there is not a Utah case 
10 exactly on point in this situation. It is to be inferred by 
11 language in those cases and also through the statutory law 
12 that's been given, that it is the physical structure that is 
13 protected through due process that he has a right to protect 
14 and give shelter to his family and to his minor children that 
15 are at home, rather than the money that is associated. 
16 It is possible, perhaps, on a forced sale for him to 
17 go out and to find a home for his family for $40,000 in this 
18 kind of situation, but I'm contending that that's not what the 
19 leaislat lve intent — not the policy that these legislators had 
20 m mind when they passed this Constitutional provision. That's 
21 why if m fact it's Constitutional. 
22 THE COURT: If I could synthesize your argument, 
23 what you're really saying is in the State of Utah under this 
24 homestead exemption, if someone claims it, that takes their 
25 hc^ ne, whatever equity, whatever value may exist, and makes it 
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1 free and clear, despite the caps that have been set forth in 
2 the statute of any judgment, of any judgment creditor. If 
3 this is a homestead exemption, it would fly against every 
4 debtor/creditor relationship that exists in the state. 
5 MR. PITTS: You know, your Honor, I — 
6 THE COURT: There is an ability for somebody to say, 
7 "My home is my castle, and therefore I may do whatever I'll 
8 do to incur debt in whatever fashion I do sor but you can't 
9 touch this," and that's what I read these caps to be. You 
10 can't touch it up to $40,000, so that at least somebody can 
11 use that exemption for purposes of finding suitable alternative 
12 habitation. 
13 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I would — 
14 THE COURT: No one — no one — it's not your argument. 
15 It sounds like it is. It sounds like your argument is simply 
16 this. A man's home is his castle. It's exempt from judgment 
17 creditors if the homestead exemption is declared, and can't be 
18 touched whether it has a value of $10,000 or $750,000. 
19 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I agree with the Court's 
20 summation of my argument with the exception that in the 
21 bankruptcy proceeding there are cases that set forth that the 
22 exemption that's granted is an allowance for that. In other 
23 words, in that context they are allowed to have $40,000 or 
24 $20,000 a person as an exemption, in liquidating all of their 
25 other assets. 
-11-
1 McMurty versus Chuggs set forth that the homestead is 
2 a benefit to those people to prelect that castle. In other 
3 words it's a reward for those debtors and creditors who do not 
4 take the steps in filing for bankruptcy. 
5 What I'm — the policy argument that I'm making, 
6 your Honor, is that folks who have the integrity, debtors who 
7 remain and keep the integrity of not declaring bankruptcy to 
8 their creditors, that is a show of good faith on their part, 
9 regardless of the circumstances that they would like to go 
10 ahead and repay their debts. 
11 Now, in my defendant's particular case that might be a 
12 lot of debts, your Honor. I understand you've overseen other 
13 cases that my defendant has come before you on, but still — 
14 THE COURT: I actually haven't seen anything. 
15 MR. PITTS: Regardless — regardless of that history, 
16 your Honor, he has not taken that: step. He has shown good 
17 faith in his situation. I feel at this time that, you know, 
18 as a reward for that, that his wife and his minor children 
19 should be granted the opportunity to stay in their home and 
20 to not be subject to forced sale, and that the words of the 
21 statute should be read as to differentiate between the 
22 exemption and the homestead, and that the homestead itself 
23 in this situation is a due process Constitutional Right, 
24 should be exempt from forced sale. 
25 THE COURT: Let me come back and ask this question. Is 
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1 there any case that you can cite to this Court in the State of 
2 Utah that indicates that this exemption merely acts as a lien 
3 and the property is not subject, of course, to sale. 
4 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I can submit a case again. It 
5 is an older case because I feel that the cases from the last 50 
6 years have all been in the bankruptcy proceeding context, but I 
7 do go ahead and cite Kimball versus Salisbury. That's 17 Utah 
8 381-53-P-1037. It's an 1898 case. I also believe that you 
9 could find that we support for that position in the 
10 Folson/Asper case. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's hear from Mr. White. 
12 MR. WHITE: By way of clarification I believe the 
13 defendant's motion is simply to object to the order — 
14 THE COURT: And I understand that, but — 
15 MR. WHITE: — for the record. 
16 THE COURT: — Mr. Miller hasn't been represented 
17 by Counsel, and I'm going to give Counsel latitude to make 
18 whatever arguments need to be made, including what this is, 
19 is in essence a reconsideration of the Court's prior argument 
20 — or prior ruling. So give him some latitude here, based upon 
21 the fact that he's not been represented. 
22 MR. WHITE: Thank you. I understand Mr. Miller's 
23 argument, and I'm looking at the document he submitted on 
24 October the 9th, 2003. 
25 THE COURT: What's that entitled? 
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1 I MR. WHITE: It's entitled, "Request for judicial notice 
2 of homestead, " which I take as supplemental to his objections 
3 to my order. In addressing Counsel's argument, and I expect 
4 Mr. Miller's idea of protecting the residence, the physical 
5 structure from the execution, and to redefine what a homestead 
6 is, instead of taking Black's Law, we've got to stick with the 
7 statutory definition, which is set forth in Title 78-23 — 
8 THE COURT: Let me just ask a question. Now, this 
9 Chugg case, McMurty case, and the language associated with 
10 those cases all suggest that the homestead exemption exists for 
11 purposes of protecting it from being subject to judicial sale. 
12 Is this statute a subsequent codification of legislature's 
13 issues, intent and otherwise? 
14 MR. WHITE: Well, I don't believe — I think they're 
15 mutually exclusive. I think the case the Court is looking for 
16 is here; 19 — the Gilroy case versus Lowe. I'm citing from 
17 that case, which was exactly the same issue being raised here 
18 that I researched — 
19 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
20 MR. WHITE: Exactly, as whether or not the physical 
21 structure is safe from the sale as opposed to just the value of 
22 the exemption, and here's what the case says. "The appellants 
23 interest in the home therefore exceeds the value of amount of 
24 the homestead exemption. A sale is not prohibited in these 
25 circumstances." 
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1 THE COURT: The appe l l an t in t h a t case was t he judgment 
2 creditor? 
3 MR. WHITE: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: So read that language to me again. 
5 MR. WHITE: Pardon? 
6 THE COURT: Read that. 
7 MR. WHITE: "The appellant was the homestead claimant.,/ 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. WHITE: The appellant's interest in the home — 
10 and one of the things that probably should have been done is 
11 they have some duty to establish what that is. I've talked to 
12 Counsel this morning and by stipulation we're going to submit 
13 to the Court the tax assessment, which puts the value at — 
14 I've marked this as Exhibit 1 — $200,099. 
15 Now, the reason for that is somewhat important. 
16 Number 1, there is case law that says that if the amount of 
17 the homestead exemption is below the value of what might be 
18 received out of the house — 
19 THE COURT: You're not able tc sell it. 
20 MR. WHITE: — you're not able to sell it. 
21 THE COURT: That is the one exception. That is not the 
22 case here. The homestead exemption is $40,000; 20 for each. 
23 The value of the home, according to that recent tax thing — we 
24 think that's a little high — is over — is $200,000. There is 
25 ample equity or value in the house to sell it. 
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1 Let me continue with the Gilroy case. This Court 
2 stated that when a claim of homestead is made, a judgment 
3 creditor is entitled — my clients — to any excess above the 
4 value constituting the homestead right. 
5 Furthermore, the homestead exemption is not a bar to 
6 execution in the present case. Assignee Federal Leasing, Inc. 
7 bid in $100,000 of the judgment against the appellants and paid 
8 to the sheriff on behalf of the appellants the $8,000 that was 
9 their homestead exemption. 
10 The Court ruled correctly that appellants were not 
11 entitled to claim the protection of the homestead exemption 
12 to set aside the execution of the sale. This is the case. 
13 This is the ruling. This is a good case. It's never been 
14 overturned. It's a 1981 case. 
15 The only thing that's been modified in that statute, 
16 according to my research, your Honor, is how to calculate what 
17 the exemptions were. I found no case that would say that this 
18 is simply limited to bankruptcy. 
19 Frankly, even in bankruptcy once the exemption is 
20 fixed, the property is abandoned, they sell it, with the 
21 proceeds going back into the estate — well, I shouldn't say 
22 that, but,they're exempt for the creditor. 
23 So even under Counsel's argument of dealing with this 
24 differently, that should not work in this Court, because that's 
25 not what the law says. 
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The physical structure itself is only exempt from 
execution of sale unless it is worth less than what the 
exemption amount is, and in this case that is simply not the 
case. Looking at the proposed order that I have submitted to 
the Court — 
THE COURT: Hang on, let me get that so that I'm 
looking at it with you. 
MR. WHITE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Order on motion to determine homestead 
exemption; is that what it's entitled? 
MR. WHITE: It says, "Order on hearing on writ of 
execution granting homestead exemption" submitted September 22. 
Has findings and conclusions on it. 
THE COURT: I have it. 
MR. WHITE: Going back a couple of months the defendant 
I submitted some other objections, which frankly a few of those I 
did incorporate into the current order before the Court, but 
the last round that he submitted, as far as I can tell, did not 
address anything further in the order, but rather argued, "You 
can't sell the structure." So I think that's where we're at 
right now. 
We would ask the Court to sign the order. I_ believe 
it comports with what the Court has said. Unless Mr. Miller 
has objections that can state to the Court at this time of why 
certain paragraphs should not be in there, we would like to get 
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1 this order signed. 
2 We believe that my clients are entitled to whatever 
3 proceeds there are over $40,000, and when we were here before, 
4 Mr. Miller I believe agreed that ~he other little piece of 
5 property was — could be sold. Now I hear Counsel arguing 
6 today it shouldn't be, but the Cojrt ordered it sold before. 
7 There was not a homestead on it. That is in the order m that 
8 relationship, and we would submit: it based upon that. 
9 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, ijst a few minutes for 
10 rebuttal? 
11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
12 MR. PITTS: The case than Counsel — plaintiff's 
13 Counsel relies on, Gilroy versus Lowe, for setting out the law, 
14 we believe in this situation may be distinguished, your Honor. 
15 The language that plaintiff's Counsel set before the Court did 
16 include the language m this case, m terms of allowing the 
17 sale of the home. 
18 We believe that in Gilroy versus Lowe there was — 
19 the facts of that case distinguish it from this one m that 
20 it was brought up entirely as a aefense in that situation; the 
21 homestead exemption from the sale, and there were no — there 
22 was no protection. There was no family to protect. 
23 The justification in raising the defense wasn't 
24 according to the statutory language, and the earlier case law 
25 language that held that the reason in a Constitutional setting 
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1 that the home should be protected from forced sale is to 
2 protect those of the family that's at home, to allow them to 
3 stay there. We believe that in the Gilroy setting that that 
4 didn't apply to this situation. 
5 My client is iaising this as an argument for his 
6 children, for the best interests of his children. I dare say 
7 that in this proceeding that they not only have an interest m 
8 this proceeding in terms of this home being sold because of 
9 their livelihood, the place where they live. It's possible 
10 that they might be able to find an apartment or they may be 
11 able to find some other place to live within the area, but I 
12 can't see m this proceeding how the best interests of the 
13 children cannot be taken into consideration when looking at the 
14 forced sale of this structure. 
15 Also, I understand that since a homestead exemption 
16 has been granted to the defendant's spouse, the defendant's 
17 spouse is not represented here as a part of this proceeding, 
18 and under Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of — I'm sorry, 19 of tie 
19 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure she would be an indispensable 
20 party to the order of the forced sale or allowing the executior 
21 on this property, because of her interest that's been granted. 
22 In other situations where there is an interest that 
23 has been granted, I understand that the procedure used to 
24 be that the interest of the defendant had been sold in the 
25 property in those situations, but not the actual structure, ana 
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1 that the minor children were allowed to live in the structure 
2 until the time that they reached the age of majority. All of 
3 those rights come from a Constitutional Right in the property. 
4 That's — and that further supports our argument. 
5 Now, in the McMurty versus Chugg that we're relying 
6 on also has language, your Honor, that we believe supports 
7 and bolsters our point as much as the Gilroy case supports 
8 plaintiff's Counsel. 
9 In McMurty/Chugg it lays out the language, "The Court 
10 rules that the head of a family may assert to prevent sale 
11 under execution of his homestead at any time before the sale 
12 of the premises, unless the claim against such property has 
13 been previously asserted and actually adjudicated against him." 
14 In that situation it actually talks, your Honor, and 
15 uses language that not just the exemption he may exert against, 
16 but he may assert to prevent the sale under execution of the 
17 entire structure. 
18 Your Honor, we really honestly believe in this 
19 situation that although this may be a case of first impression 
20 before this Court for at least 40 or 50 years, that this is rhe 
21 path that this ought to take. That this case ought to receive 
22 a Constitutional consideration along the due process line fcr 
23 property rights, and should not — that homestead falls under 
24 those. We cite the Kimball case. 
25 We cite the Utah State Constitution, that this is a 
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1 Constitutional creation. Homestead simply isn't a mechanism of 
2 money that has evolved and come somehow. It has its roots in 
3 Constitution. It doesn't have its roots in creditor/debtor 
4 relationships. It doesn't have its roots in bankruptcy law. 
5 We assert that this is a case where we should go back to those 
6 roots. 
7 That we should go ahead and split the doctrine at this 
8 time on homestead. That there should be a line pertaining to 
9 those that declare bankruptcy, and that those are entitled only 
10 to keep the exemptions that they claim, and that those who do 
11 not declare bankruptcy should be considered outside of that 
12 scope, and that there is another body of law that this Court 
13 should consider in that situation, and that my defend — that 
14 the defendant's rights fall in that situation in this case, 
15 in order to protect his family, to protect his interest in 
16 his property, to protect his minor children in their best 
17 interests, and that this Court should not allow the forced 
18 sale, but should come up with a more creative solution in this 
19 situation that would allow my client, the defendant, to retain 
20 possession of his home. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. It appears 
22 from the plain reading of the statute that the exemption has a 
23 cap, and I see nothing in the order proposed by Counsel that 
24 appears objectionable. Nor have I heard any argument other 
25 than really reconsideration of the argument once provided by 
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1 Mr. Miller in some time past associated with exception to the 
2 order itself. 
3 Certainly rne consequences associated with a number 
4 of activities that take place in debtor/creditor relationships 
5 accrue to the detriment of the parties who have the debt. This 
6 is one of those circumstances, and the legislature has made 
7 clear that that h -esuead exemption doesn't create an enviable 
8 castle, but it creates an enviable castle up to a certain 
9 interest amount. 
10 That interest amount is specifically set forth in the 
11 statute, and the Gilroy case seems to be apparent on its face 
12 to be applicable to this very case, and that is simply that 
13 forced sales may take place of a homestead exemption, with the 
14 homestead simply being the amount carved out and any potential 
15 equity m the home thar's not available for attachment. 
16 Accordingly I'll grant the order. I think I have it 
17 here, but if you have a new one, I have one that's m my file 
18 and I'll sign it tcaay. So this concludes this issue. 
19 MR. WHITE: I only have my copy, your Honor. I don't 
20 think it's an original. If not, I'll bring one up today. 
21 THE COURT: Well, let's see if it is. 
22 MR. PITTS: Your Honor, for the record, defense Counsel 
23 would like to object. 
24 THE COURT: Yean, I took that by way of your argument 
25 that you were objecting. 
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1 MR. PITTS: Sure, I 'm ju s t p re se rv ing the r e c o r d , your 
2 Honor. 
3 THE COURT: All right. I can take this out. I'm not 
4 sure that it' s an original either, but — okay, here' s a copy 
5 of the order. You may certify it or whatever else ycu need 
6 to do with it. The Exhibit No. 1 has been received as to the 
7 value that exists in excess of the homestead exemption. This 
8 Court's in recess, 
9 MR. WHITE: Thank you, your Honor. 
10 I (Hearing concluded. 
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN ) 
HOUGHTON, KENDALLR. THOMAS, ) 
MARLENETHOMAS, and the 1995 ) 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendant 
ORDER ON HEARING ON WRIT OF 
l EXECUTION GRANTING HOMESTEAD 
1 EXEMPTION 
) Civil No;i000301127 
) Judge Randall Skanchy 
The Defendant's Motion for Hearing on Writ of Execution before the Honorable Randall N. 
Skanchy, Judge, on the 4th day of August, 2003; the Defendant, Glen E. Miller, was personally 
^present and represented himself; the Plaintiffs were all personally present and represented by 
Douglas R-White, Attorney; and good cause appearing, therefore the Court enters the following 
Order: 
2003 DEC - U AH 10: 0 7 
FILED GY. 
1 
FINDINGS 
1. A prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the real property in question and 
was granted on March 26, 2001. 
2. A judgment was entered on April 10,2003 against Glen E. Miller in this matter. 
3. Lori Miller, the wife of the Defendant, filed a declaration of homestead on the subj ect 
property on March 26,2003, and she either took occupancy of the property in March or May of 2003. 
4. A Writ of Execution was issued on May 1,2003; and a sale of the property, subject 
to execution, was scheduled for July 23, 2003. 
5. Defendant filed a request for hearing on the Writ of Execution, and the Court ordered 
a stay of execution, pending hearing on July 22,2003. The matter was continued until August 4, 
2003. 
6. The prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the two (2) real properties at 
anime when Defendant did not occupy either property as his residence, nor did any member of his 
family. 
7. On March 26,2001, when the prejudgment Writ of Attachment became a lien against 
the following described two (2) parcels of real property, the Defendant's and his family's primary 
residence was 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah, which is not either of the two (2) real properties 
subject to this action: 
PARCEL NO 1: Beginning 3OTfeet South of the Northwest Corner of Block 26, 
Plat A, Tooele City Survey, running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; 
thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; ihenct West 495 feet; thence North 66 5 
2 
feet to point of beginning. Containing 0.77 acres. Parcel No. 02-42-14. 
PARCEL NO. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast Corner of Lot 5, 
Block 41, Plat A, Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, running thence West 196.96feet; 
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 feet to the point 
of beginning. Containing 0.20 acres. Parcel No. 2-57-27. 
8. Defendant was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison on March 27,2002. Thereafter, 
Defendant's wife started to repair the uninhabitable house (Parcel No. 1) to live in, and moved in 
approximately March o* May of 2003. The prejudgment lien was taken against Parcel No. 1 on 
March 26,2001. 
9. Thereafter, Defendant lost his primary residence, that being 891 Upland Drive, 
Tooele, Utah^through a mortgage foreclosure in approximately December 2002. 
10r Parcel No. 1, on March 26, 2001,-was an old uninhabitable rental house that was 
vacant and had had no renters in it for some time. 
11. Parcel No. 2 is vacant ground, has no residence on it, and produces no income or 
support to the Defendant's family. 
12. There are no mortgages against either parcel of real property. 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
13. The prejudgment Writ of Attachment, filed on March 26, 2001, is defeated by the 
filing of a homestead declaration on March 26,2003. 
14? The amount of homesteadjexemption is $20,000.00 for Glen E. Miller and $20,000.00 
for Lori L. Miller, pursuant to Section 78-23-3(2), U.C.A. as against Parcel No. 1. 
3 
12. Parcel No. 2 has no homestead exemption. 
13. The Plaintiffs shall renotice the Sheriffs Sale, which was previously stayed by the 
Court, and proceed with the sale of both parcels of real property, subject to this Order. 
DATED this _ 4 l day of JXct^hen 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
RANDALL SKANCHT 
Judge 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT 
TO: GLEN E.MILLER 
Pursuant to Rule 4.504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on 
4 
this 22nd day of September, 2003, to the following person(s): 
Glen E. Miller, USP No. 33042 
Defendant 
Utah State Prison 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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SON, Legal Assistant 
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DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bounti&l, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 652-0016 
FAX: (801)296-1754 
,D_„ FILED 
3
* D DISTRICT COURT TOOELE 
01 APR 17 AH K): 1*8 
FILED BY. 
Fee: 18.00 Cash 
CALLEEN B. PESHELL, Recorder 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL LfcS F 
TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN 
HOUGHTON,KENDALLR. THOMAS, 
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995 
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GLEN E. MILLER, 
Defendants. 
ss 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF 
ATTACHMENT 
'TATEOFFTAH ) 
CODNH OF TOOELE) 
mat appears of record in tlw offke of ihv fooele Co-mrv Pecorcter 
^ ^ yyfc WitneM Mv fl'n.d \*id Seal , 
Judge David S. Young ***-* 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the 
26th day of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. Young, Judge; the Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their attorney, Douglas F. White; the Defendant was not personally present, but 
was represented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having reviewed the pleadings and 
the evidence by proffer of the attorneys, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the 
following Order: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following 
described parcels of real property is hereby granted: 
E 1 6 4 9 0 6 B O G 8 7 P 0 0 2 2 
Parcel No. 1. All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City. 
Serial No. 10-8-C-l 
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41, 
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.96 feet; 
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27 
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest comer of 
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of 
beginning bring the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and 
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-42-14 
2. The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the 
above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest 
to another in anyway. 
3. A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear 
before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time 
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of 
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances. 
DATED this day of April, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S.YdUNG] 
Third Distrfct Court Aidgi 
2 
E 1 6 4 9 0 6 B 0 6 8 7 P 0 0 2 3 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY 
TO: Gregory P. Hawkins 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the 
undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is 
mailed to you to allow you sufiBcient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing 
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that 
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing. 
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this 
ffi^Qay of March, 2001, to the following person(s): 
Gregory P. Hawkins 
Attorney for Defendant 
136 South Main Street, 6* Floor 
Salt lake City, Utah 84115 
JUD^ETEgSON 
(Lhart—» 
Legal Assistant 
I CERTIFY THAI THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN TOE THIRO 
OISTRICT COURT. TOOELE COUNTY. STATE 
OF UTAH s\ t{ 
3 
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ADDENDUM 15 
The question of jurisdiction was raised because the issues raised in this cross appeal were 
to a post-judgment order dated August 7, 2003 (Addendum 9). It appears that any objections to 
that order should have been raised within the 30-day time period allotted by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure for post-judgment motions. See Cahoon v. Cahoon. 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 
1982) where the Utah Supreme Court said, "The final judgment rule does not preclude review of 
post judgment orders; such orders were independently subject to the test of finality, according to 
their own substance and effect." Where the real issue before the court at the hearing on August 
4, 2003, was whether or not Miller's property qualified for a homestead exemption (Addendum 
1, page 410). The order and ruling dated August 7, 2003, decided the issue against Houghtons 
and Thomas' and granted the homestead exemption to Miller. "[T]he fact that the court retained 
jurisdiction to adjudicate further matters [such as whether a homestead was subject to a forced 
sale] did not leave open for reconsideration the question as to [whether Miller qualified for a 
homestead exemption], and the decree entered was final and appealable, and became conclusive 
in the absence of a timely appeal." In re Vorhees' Estate 12 Utah 2d. 361. 366 P.2d 977 (1961). 
Houghtons and Thomas' did not file a notice to appeal these issues until December 30, 2003. 
(Addendum 1, Pages 538-539). Timeliness of their appeal is questioned. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
1. Constitution of UTAH, Article XXII Section 1: 
'The Legislature shall provide by statute for an exemption of a homestead which may 
consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurtenances and improvements 
thereon from sale on execution." 
2. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-3(2)fc): 
"A person may claim a homestead exemption in one or more parcels of real property 
together with appurtenances and improvements." 
3. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-3(3): 
"A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from levy, execution, or forced sale 
except for: 
(a) statutory liens for property taxes and assessments on property; 
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens for debts created for the purchase 
price of the property; 
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance 
for dependent children; and 
(d) consensual liens obtained on debts created by mutual contract." 
4. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-3(5)0)): 
"The proceeds of any sale to the amount of the homestead exemption existing at time of 
sale, is exempt from levy, execution, or other process for one year after the receipt of the 
proceeds by the person entitled to the exemption." 
5. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-3(6): 
'The sale and disposition of one homestead does not prevent the selection or purchase of 
another." 
6. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-23-4: 
uAn individual may select and claim a homestead by complying with the following 
requirements: 
(1) Filing a signed and acknowledged declaration of homestead with the recorder of the 
county or counties in which the homestead claimant's property is located or serving a 
signed and acknowledged declaration of homestead upon the sheriff or other officer 
conducting an execution prior to the time stated in the notice of such execution." 
